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Current History

JANUARY, 1960

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West Germany as a World Power

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THE NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

February, 1960

In February, 1960, we continue our series on problems arising from the cold war with our study of Southeast Asian countries. How real is the threat of Southeast Asian instability to the peace and security of the entire world? The following seven articles will explore questions such as these:

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SEATO AND THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT by *Norman J. Padelford*, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Current History

Vol. 38

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As Germany takes her place once again as a world power, her foreign policies and her military standing assume a real significance for the Western world. Here, seven articles explore current German views of the international scene in the light of German history and her military potential. Perhaps most important are German policies toward the Soviet Union. As our introductory article points out: "Until recently some Germans harbored the illusion that they could induce the Soviet Union to abandon its Communist positions in Central Europe by offering the neutralization of Germany. But the Soviet Union does not want the neutralization of Germany but the integration of Germany into the Soviet system. This is unacceptable to the large majority of the citizens of the Federal Republic."

Germany and Russia

By HANS KOHN

Professor of History, City College of New York

GERMAN-Russian relations belong to modern history. For most of the past, Germany's center and German interests were in the West. Only the rise of Prussia to ascendancy in the eighteenth century and the simultaneous westward expansion of Russia started the process of German-Russian relations. It was not without significance that Prussia became a kingdom in 1701 by a ceremony held in Königsberg, Prussia's easternmost city. In the Seven Years War (1756-1763) the Russians originally fought as Austria's allies against Prussia. They invaded eastern Prussia and in October, 1760, even entered Berlin. The position of Frederick II, Prussia's famous king, became desperate. He was saved unexpectedly by the death, in January, 1762, of Empress Elizabeth of Russia, whose successor Peter III, Frederick's fervent admirer, defected from the alliance, made peace with Prussia and thereby saved Frederick and his realm.

From that time on, Prussia and Russia were on the whole on friendly terms. Frederick II and the Russian Empress Catherine II were the main movers in the partition of

Poland. A long common frontier of the two countries was thereby established. After the defeat of Prussia by the French in 1806, it was the intervention of the Russian czar which saved Prussia from extinction. At the beginning of 1813 the Prussian army was the first to join the Russian armies which advanced into Europe, in the pursuit of the French. During the ensuing period of the Holy Alliance the court of Berlin relied generally on the court of St. Petersburg. Both were determined to stop the penetration of Western liberal ideas into central and eastern Europe. It was at that time that the Prussian monarchy rose to leadership in Germany. The Prussianization of Germany in the nineteenth century—a process which none could have predicted in the early eighteenth century—put German-Russian relations into the forefront of German policy.

The Prussian statesman who was mainly responsible for this development, Otto von Bismarck, worked for the preservation of German-Russian friendship. His attitude was based on two considerations: Russia's and Prussia's common interests in keeping

Poland partitioned and subjected, and their common hostility to Western liberalism and democracy. This hostility was one of the motivating forces behind Bismarck's policy of alliances. The treaty which he concluded with Austria-Hungary and Italy on May 20, 1882, declared that one of its aims was "to fortify the monarchical principle and thereby to assure the unimpaired maintenance of the [existing] social and political order." As long as Bismarck directed German foreign policy he succeeded, in spite of his alliance with Austria-Hungary, in keeping Russia in close friendship with Prussia in pursuit of their common anti-liberal ideas.

The picture changed with the adventurous new foreign policy of Bismarck's successors. This policy drove autocratic Russia and republican France into a defensive agreement against the vague threats of the new German policy. Theories of race and national destiny, alien to Bismarck's thought, now found expression among German and Russian intellectuals. Pan Germanism looked to the east and southeast for the fulfillment of the historical mission of the German people; Pan Slavism looked to the west and southwest as a field in which the manifest destiny of the Russian nation would be realized. The war of 1914 found Germany and Russia in opposite camps. In fact, the war started in a struggle between Slavism supported by Russia and Germanism supported by Germany. Whereas German conservatives saw England and English liberalism as the chief enemy in the war of 1914, German socialists justified the war as a conflict with Russian autocracy.

The war ended in 1918 with an unexpected result, the defeat of both antagonists, Russia and Germany. Both lost, for the time being, in power and territory. The many nationalities which lived between Germany and Russia from the Arctic Sea in the north to the Aegean Sea in the south and which were subject before 1914 to Russian or German control or influence, gained their independence and established their territorial borders, to a large extent, at the expense of Russia and Germany.

A Common Bond

The fact that Germany and Russia emerged as defeated nations from the war of 1914, that they were treated as outcasts by

the victors, and that the victors represented a Western democracy which the Russian and the Prussian regimes had always scornfully rejected, created a common bond between the two nations. They found themselves united in their violent opposition to the peace treaties of 1919. The ideologies which became dominant in Russia and Germany after 1918 had one fundamental common trait—they regarded Western democracy as decadent and doomed. "The great gamble on the disintegration of the Western bourgeois world" was facilitated by Western disunity and disarmament, by widespread intellectual cynicism and indifference, and a few years later, by the economic depression. The Germans were determined to undo the defeat of 1918. Two roads seemed open to them, to achieve future greatness either in cooperation with, or in a life and death struggle against, Russia, which had emerged from the war under Communist domination. The final German answer to the question which road to take in the war against the West was given only on June 22, 1941.

The Reichswehr under General Hans von Seeckt supported after 1918 close cooperation with Russia. In a memorandum of July, 1922, to the then German Chancellor Joseph Wirth, Seeckt declared that Poland's very existence was "incompatible with the vital needs of Germany." Three months before, Germany had signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Soviet Russia. Though the text of the treaty was innocuous, it marked a decided success for Soviet policy. It ended Russia's isolation and it bore out Lenin's prediction that Soviet Russia would be able to exploit the antagonisms among the "capitalist" nations. Similarly, the Germans greeted the treaty as a beginning of a new independent power policy which broke through the circle of "enslavement" imposed by Versailles. Germany started to defy the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles; the Reichswehr produced the forbidden weapons—military aircraft, poison gas, tanks and heavy artillery—in Soviet Russia. This cooperation brought Russia the benefits of the most modern technology in armaments.

Many German intellectuals went much farther than the German government. In the 1920's Germany had the strongest Communist party outside Russia. In the elec-

tions of November, 1932, it received almost six million votes. Even among the Rightist intellectuals, sympathy for "socialist and revolutionary" Russia as against the despised "bourgeois" West was not unknown.

Less than two decades after the peace treaty of Versailles, which as the Germans and some Westerners claimed had crippled Germany for any foreseeable future, Germany was strong enough to try to undo the defeat of 1918 and to impose her will upon Europe. Meanwhile, Russia too had made great progress from the state of devastation, into which the defeat in World War I, the Communist revolution and the civil war had plunged her. In view of the weakness and disunity of the West the time was fast approaching when the new independent nations in central-eastern Europe, situated between Germany and Russia, were again to face an attempt by Germany and Russia to impose their control upon these lands. Were Germany and Russia to cooperate, as they did in the nineteenth century, or were they to fight about central-eastern Europe? The answer did not lie with the Russians but with the Germans.

In 1939, German leadership decided to cooperate with Russia. The two countries again partitioned Poland as they had done in the eighteenth century. In agreement with Germany Russia pushed her frontier westward and regained not only eastern Poland but the Baltic republics, Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Meanwhile, Germany expanded far into central-eastern Europe. The events of June 22, 1941, reversed the official German policy. By her aggression against Russia Germany not only gained full control of all central-eastern European lands but expanded this control deep into Russia. This time, however, the outcome was different from that of the war of 1914. Benefiting from the help of the West, Russia turned the invading German armies back and pursued them into the heart of Germany. As they had done in the middle of the eighteenth century, Russian troops again entered Berlin. Königsberg became a Russian city and was renamed Kaliningrad. The whole of central-eastern Europe, including the eastern part of Germany, was in 1945 under Russian control.

The defeat of 1945 produced fundamental

changes in the political structure of Germany and in German attitudes toward democracy. Prussia has ceased to exist. The Junker class has lost its economic hold on, and its political influence in, the lands east of the Elbe. The center of gravity in Germany has shifted again to the west and southwest where it had been in the many centuries before Prussia rose to ascendance in Germany. Berlin, which became Germany's capital only in 1871 as a result of Prussia's victories over the German Confederation in 1866 and over France in 1870, has been replaced by Bonn, a city on the western bank of the Rhine. The German Federal Republic, in the larger part of Germany, bears no resemblance to the German Reich of 1871, of 1919 or of 1933. Its orientation is definitely towards the West. It is in closer relationship—politically, spiritually and economically—with the West than Germany has ever been in modern times.

Unholy Alliance?

Nevertheless, some people in the West, remembering the past and the policies of Bismarck, of Rapallo and of the August, 1939, treaty, ask the anxious question: whether Germany will not again turn toward collaboration with Russia in an easy or uneasy, in a holy or unholy alliance? Or will Germany resume her policies of 1914 and 1941 and go to war against Soviet Russia to re-establish her control over at least some of the central-eastern European lands? To this writer the answer is an unhesitating "no." For since 1945, not only Germany herself, but the European and world framework within which German policy has to work has fundamentally changed.

The situation of the 1920's offered Germany a tempting chance to resume her drive toward European or world hegemony. Spengler and Hitler regarded Russia and the United States as feeble and unstable countries, the one disintegrating through Bolshevism, the other through capitalism. The years since 1942 have revealed the error of this assumption. Even a "united" and highly armed Germany could not entertain today the hope of defeating the Soviet Union. The weakness and isolation of Germany's eastern and southernmost neighbors which after 1918 tempted even German liberals and So-

cialists to a campaign against Poland no longer exist. Today, these nations are undergoing a process of rapid industrialization and are protected by the power of the Soviet Union.

Even more important for a limitation of German desires for a new power policy is the close unity of the Western democracies, above all of Britain and the United States. If such a unity had existed in the 1920's, it could have prevented the rise of Hitler and the outbreak of World War II. The economic depression which hit the West eleven years after the end of World War I has, contrary to popular expectations, not reappeared after World War II. The two main weapons of post-1918 Germany in preparing her new war—the successful agitation against Western unity and democratic confidence, and the “independent power game” between Russia and the West—have become blunted, perhaps irreparably so.

The Problem of Unification

A revival of a militant German chauvinism comparable to the situation in the Weimar Reich, which would turn against Russia for the reconquest of central-eastern Europe, is, to say the least, most improbable in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is equally improbable that the Federal Republic will pursue the unification of the two Germanies that emerged as a result of German aggression against Russia in 1941 through accommodation with Soviet Russia. Such an accommodation could be had only at a price—not only the abandonment of the ties with the West, but the abandonment of the free society which has so auspiciously developed in the Federal Republic. For this free society can be maintained in Germany only in closest cooperation with the free West.

One of the leading German historians of today, Professor Ludwig Dehio, in a brilliant and penetrating analysis, published in his *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, has summed up the present situation in the following courageous words:

For today liberty—that is the liberty of the individual, not of the state—can only be preserved as the common property of a consolidated group of nations, and any nation which draws aside to save its own unity will lose it. A hundred years ago the most pressing goal

was national unity; for the preservation of freedom offered no problem in the sense in which it does today, whereas unity was the natural demand within that system of nation states which is lying in ruins today. Now, however, after the Third Reich has abused and thrown away our unity by denying freedom, unity must be subordinated to the superior and wider aim of freedom, for today a demand for unity surely has an anachronistic flavor about it. No political watchword can be transplanted into a new situation without carrying with it traces of the soil in which it grew previously.¹

The question of German unity is closely connected with two other problems. One is the question of the eastern frontiers of Germany. Throughout the history of German nationalism this problem has played an unfortunate role. It weakened the position of German liberals in 1848, when the assertion of the principle that national power and greatness take precedence over individual liberties and the rights of the citizen took hold of the German mind in connection with the problem of the eastern frontier. After 1918, the question of the eastern frontiers of Germany was again one of the most powerful factors undermining German democracy. Public opinion in the Weimar Reich almost unanimously (even among Socialists) regarded Germany's eastern frontiers as “unbearable.” To which frontiers should Germany “return,” in the case of unification? Those of 1919 aroused utmost indignation in Germany. Certainly a return to the frontiers of 1914, perhaps enlarged by the addition of Austria and the Sudetenland, is unthinkable.

It is understandable and legitimate that those Germans expelled from the territories which form part of Poland and Czechoslovakia desire to return to their homelands and cherish the memories of centuries of settlement there. But in the present world situation any such restorative dreams must have disastrous consequences not only for peace but for German democracy.

This brings us to a second consideration connected with the problem of German unification. The present division of Germany

¹ Professor Dehio's article first appeared in *Aussenpolitik* of June 1953. It is reprinted in an English translation in his *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf 1959) p. 138, a book which has so far not received the attention that it deserves as the most original interpretation of the German-European situation of the present century.

is not the result of Western mistakes but of the German *Drang nach Osten*, of German aggression and miscalculation. By imposing their system on part of Germany the Communists did not replace there liberty or a civilized regime by terror. They replaced one heinous tyranny with another. It was the fault of the Germans that Communist tyranny was imposed on many non-German lands east of Germany. All friends of liberty desire the end of tyranny in all these lands. In the general misery, brought about by National Socialism, the German territory still under tyranny can hardly expect preferential treatment. Nor as long as the present world tension lasts—and that means for any foreseeable future—can the Communists be expected to abandon such economically and industrially valuable territories as eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia. Until recently some Germans harbored the illusion that they could induce the Soviet Union to abandon its advanced Communist positions in Central Europe by offering the neutralization of Germany. But the Soviet Union does not want the neutralization of Germany but the integration of Germany into the Soviet system. This is unacceptable to the large majority of the citizens of the Federal Republic.

The question of unity and eastern frontiers does not exercise that obsessive power over the German mind today which undermined democracy in the Weimar Republic. The Weimar Republic perished because many of its citizens thought of it and its frontiers as a temporary makeshift enforced by Allied victory. Today most Germans accept, at

least tacitly, the Federal Republic. They know, as Professor Dehio pointed out, that under today's conditions a free society can only be preserved by close cooperation with other free societies and that freedom must take precedence over unity.

The German Federal Republic is the first consolidated German democracy, the first German state for well over 100 years which is again part and partner of the Western community, a community rich in diversity and variety, within which Germany takes its place. Its frontiers may change. Germans—and other peoples—now living under the regime of no freedom, will, we hope, one day regain freedom, and then the Germans will share the freedom of the Federal Republic of Germany. But whatever its frontiers, it is important that the present fundamental structure and outlook of the Federal Republic in close collaboration with its fellow members of the Western community be preserved as the one lasting gain won out of the catastrophe which National Socialism brought on Germany and Europe.

Hans Kohn has been a student of nationalism for many years. Among his books are *Making of the Modern French Mind* (1955), *American Nationalism* (1957) and *The Idea of Nationalism, A Study in Its Origins and Background*, published in 1944 and now in its seventh printing. He is a contributing editor of *Current History*.

“... I feel impelled at this time to speak about the vital question of our national life, the question of German reunification. In this, we are all united, irrespective of party and religious affiliations and of professional interests, and united in the belief that we Germans know only one Germany. One part of our fatherland, living in bondage, is at present still denied the inalienable right of self-determination and homeland. In the long run, however, it will not remain separated, either by absurd boundaries or by brute disruption of personal ties; for it would be an insoluble contradiction if those who today concede to the people of Asia and Africa their right to freedom and self-determination deny us Germans this natural right. ...

“... To all our brothers and sisters in Central and East Germany I wish today to ... tell them that we, who live in freedom, particularly feel the responsibility to create a united Germany.”

—Heinrich Lübke, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, in an address before the German parliament, September 15, 1959.

"... In view of the American tendency to 'overcompensate' . . . one cannot help wondering whether our friendly attitude toward Germany today is not merely another example of the vacillation we have shown in our dealings with that country in the past." A noted specialist reviews the history of relations between. . .

The United States and Germany

By HANS W. GATZKE

Professor of History, Johns Hopkins University

RELATIONS between the United States and Germany are better today than they have ever been. For the first time in history the two countries are united, by way of Nato, in an alliance which is one of the chief links in the free world's system of defense against communism. One wonders, however, whether this happy state of affairs will last. In the past 50 years our attitude towards Germany has undergone several radical changes, such as did not happen in our relations with any other major power, not even Russia. A brief look at this American vacillation towards Germany will reveal some of the factors that in the past have made for discord or harmony between these two key powers. The insights thus gained may help us in assessing the durability of the present era of good feeling.¹

Until the outbreak of the First World War, American-German relations were cordial. German sentiment supported the North in its struggle to preserve the Union, and American sentiment in turn viewed with favor Bismarck's founding of the German Reich. Toward the end of the century, the expanding energies of both nations led to a few disputes in South America and the Pacific, but the subsequent efforts of Theodore

Roosevelt and William II, who were alike in so many ways, kept the two nations on friendly terms. United States-German understanding was aided by the many Americans of German descent. According to the 1900 census, more than seven million American citizens were of recent German origin; and while this large German element was treated somewhat patronizingly by the dominant Anglo-Saxon faction in the East, elsewhere, especially in the Middle West, German-Americans were both influential and respected. Prominent citizens of German origin, from Carl Schurz and Francis Lieber to Kuno Francke and Hugo Münsterberg, did their best to further understanding between their two countries; and Germany's contributions in science, music and education were generally recognized and appreciated.

James Bryant Conant, from 1952 until 1957 America's first ambassador to the new German Federal Republic, recalls from experience the change that took place in United States-German relations after war broke out in 1914:

After the invasion of Belgium, everyone who had studied in Germany (or almost everyone) remembered all the things he had disliked in that country. During the period of neutrality when the tensions between the pro-Ally and the pro-German groups in this country increased, Harvard was almost unanimously pro-Ally. Indeed, the few professors of German origin were

Hans W. Gatzke has published three books: *The Present in Perspective, Germany's Drive to the West*, and *Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany*. He is now a Contributing Editor of *Current History*.

¹ For a discussion of Germany's attitude towards America see Fritz T. Epstein, "Germany and the United States: Basic Patterns of Conflict and Understanding," in George L. Anderson, ed., *Issues and Conflicts: Studies in Twentieth Century American Diplomacy* (University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, Kansas: 1959), pp. 284-314.

snubbed and ostracized. When in 1917 the United States entered the war, neutrality gave way to belligerency and dislike to hatred.²

Here we have the first of several reversals in America's attitude towards Germany. German-Americans, understandably enough, were reluctant to join in the wholesale condemnation of their country of origin. As dislike gave way not merely to hatred but to hysteria, the use of German in public was prohibited in some states, sauerkraut became "liberty cabbage," and "hyphenated" Americans became objects of scorn and suspicion. But even though German propaganda tried to take advantage of the resulting domestic cleavage, most German-Americans remained loyal to their adopted country.³

There were several reasons for the United States to enter the war, foremost among them Germany's ruthless submarine campaign. But even if the interests of the United States had not been thus directly affected, her pre-war relations with Great Britain had been such that intervention on the British side would have been likely in any case, especially if England had been threatened by defeat at the hands of Germany.⁴ As far as sentiment was involved in the decision to intervene, therefore, the United States was pro-British first and anti-German second. Only after she entered the war did public opinion suddenly turn against all things German, although the American government still made some distinction between the German people and its rulers.

George Kennan has given as explanation for this sudden descent into unreason the aversion of America or any democracy to go to war:

Democracy fights in anger—it fights for the very reason that it was forced to go to war. It fights to punish the power that was rash enough and hostile enough to provoke it—to teach that power a lesson it will not forget, to prevent the thing from happening again.⁵

American Aid to Germany

American Germanophobia was thus a phenomenon born of war. It disappeared again after peace returned. The United States started on its post-war policy towards Germany by refusing to identify itself with

the Treaty of Versailles. This American withdrawal into isolationism, while dissociating the United States from Allied vengeance, nevertheless was of doubtful value, since it left the new Weimar Republic entirely at the mercy of the European powers. When it came to coping with the war's economic legacy, however, the United States played a more positive role, both in trying to settle the thorny reparations problem and in aiding German recovery with substantial loans. As early as 1922, Britain's ambassador to Germany, Lord D'Abernon, wrote: "American businessmen here are pro-German, going as far as to doubt Germany's responsibility for the war."

It was not long before "revisionist" American historians like Sidney Fay and Harry Elmer Barnes, harboring similar doubts, began to modify the current version of German war guilt. As France tried to enforce strict German adherence to the terms of Versailles, the United States further dissociated herself from Allied policy. The United States ambassadors in Berlin during the 1920's—Alanson B. Houghton and Jacob Gould Schurmann—were known for their pro-German leanings. Germany's foreign minister Gustav Stresemann wrote in 1927: Schurmann "wishes from his heart for the recovery of Germany and will do everything to further it."

Occasionally, Americans would worry whether the Germans had really changed their ways, especially when they elected their World War hero, Field-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, President of the Republic in 1925. But when a Zeppelin bearing Hindenburg's name began its trans-Atlantic crossings several years later, this latest evidence of German ingenuity was widely cheered. These were the days when German industry, with the aid of American loans, was "rationalized" along American lines; when new German ocean liners broke all speed records; when German fliers were the first to cross the Atlantic from Europe to the New World;

² James Bryant Conant, *Germany and Freedom—A Personal Appraisal* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1958), pp. 79–80.

³ Felice A. Bonadio, "The Failure of German Propaganda in the United States, 1914–1917," *Mid-America*, vol. 41, pp. 40–57.

⁴ Howard Beale, "Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II, und die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen," *Die Welt als Geschichte*, vol. 15, p. 187.

⁵ George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900–1950* (New American Library, N.Y.: 1952), p. 66.

and when a Hohenzollern Prince worked as a mechanic in the Ford motor works in Detroit. Germany's ambassador to Washington, Count Ago von Maltzan, found himself welcomed with open arms. "The hearts of America went out to him," Stresemann wrote after Maltzan's untimely death in 1927, "in memory of the old traditional friendship with Germany."

America's attitude towards Germany had thus once again turned full circle and gone back to where it had been in 1914. In 1929, that astute observer of the German scene, Lord D'Abernon, referred to "the close sympathy and instinctive understanding between Americans and Germans," pointing out that Germany had a "profound respect for the United States." The eagerness of many Americans, especially businessmen, to see only the good in all things German, became most evident after the advent of Hitler in 1933.

The United States government from the beginning maintained an attitude of watchful coolness towards the Führer's regime, and the United States ambassador to Berlin, William E. Dodd, noted with dismay the many unhappy changes taking place in a country whose history he knew so well. The American Jewish community, furthermore, supported by a rapidly growing number of political and racial refugees, gave many a timely warning against the rising Nazi threat. But there were many people who closed their eyes to the ultimate implications of events in Germany and who not only defended the Nazi revolution as a purely German matter, but hailed some of Hitler's domestic achievements. Selfish economic considerations and ignorance of German affairs no doubt were partly responsible for this unfortunate blindness to the true nature of Nazism. But genuine sympathy with the German people and their recent tribulations, together with a feeling that the United States, through participation in World War I, had been partly to blame for Germany's misfortunes, also played their part. Americans of German origin showed little enthusiasm for what was happening in their former country, despite the valiant efforts of Fritz Kuhn and his "German-American Bund." The number of German-Americans by 1940 had declined to little over five million, of which only about

one-third still showed any interest in German traditions. Of these "only an infinitesimal fraction were Nazis."⁶

The reluctance of many Americans to face the realities of Nazism did not survive Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and his attack upon Poland the following year. Still, it took the United States more than two years to travel the road from neutrality to intervention. There was no marked increase in anti-German feeling during this period; such feeling had been strong from the beginning of the war. Even after the United States became a belligerent in 1941, there was none of the anti-German hysteria of World War I. Hitler's use of fifth column tactics necessitated careful surveillance of people of recent German origin, but the methods employed by the authorities were both efficient and fair. At the beginning of the war a distinction was still made between the German people and their Nazi leaders; but since the majority of Germans obviously supported their government's war effort, such distinction gradually disappeared. A number of writers, furthermore, now began treating Nazism as an outgrowth of inherent German characteristics or as the inevitable result of German history. This further tended to erase the difference between Germans and Nazis.

Even though most Americans by 1941 were united in their condemnation of Nazism, the United States' chief motive in fighting Germany was realistic rather than ideological. France's tragic fall and Britain's gallant resistance were a sufficient call to arms for many people in the Eastern United States. But more important to the majority of Americans was the threat posed to the Western Hemisphere by a possible Nazi victory. There was a superficial similarity between America's policy in 1917 and in 1941. Both times United States intervention helped to save Great Britain; but on the second occasion even more than on the first, self-interest alone demanded that the United States fight Germany.

A Punitive Policy

It was only as fighting continued and losses mounted that the war turned into a "crusade" against Germany. During the final phase of

⁶ Joachim Remak, "'Friends of the New Germany': The Bund and German-American Relations," *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 29, p. 41.

the conflict, chiefly on American initiative, the strictly punitive policy embodied in the famous "Morgenthau Plan" was merged with a demand for Germany's "unconditional surrender." The complicated story of American wartime planning for Germany's future is only now beginning to be told.⁷ For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the United States official attitude towards Germany remained uncertain and flexible during the early years of the war. Only towards the end did it harden into a rigid formula in which realistic proposals for reform became mixed with unrealistic demands for revenge. As far back as 1944, James P. Warburg, penetrating critic of American foreign policy, had warned: "If in our German policy we are motivated by hate, we shall be unjust; and if we commit injustice at the beginning, we shall overcompensate for that injustice at the end."⁸ As it turned out, this was a fairly accurate prediction of America's policy towards Germany after World War II.

The outlines of that policy are well enough known. For a short while the spirit of the "Morgenthau Plan" prevailed. The "non-fraternization" rule, together with our emphasis on "collective guilt," came as a deep shock to the Germans who, even to this day, are not fully aware of how much they were hated during the war. Daily contacts between our occupation forces and the German people, however, gradually helped to soften the initial harshness of the American attitude. A first official note of encouragement to Germany was sounded in the speech of Secretary of State Byrnes at Stuttgart on September 6, 1946. "The American people," he said, "want to help the German people to win their way back to an honorable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world." Differences between the Western Allies and Russia from the start interfered with this hopeful prospect. The final result of these differences was the proclamation, in 1948-1949, of two separate German regimes—the free "German Federal Republic" in the West, and the Communist-dominated "German Democratic Republic" in the East.

In its relations with the Federal Republic, the United States has lived up to the promise of Secretary Byrnes. Germany's economic recovery and her integration into the Western community of nations are treated elsewhere

in this issue. The climax of these developments came with the admission of Western Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1955. On major issues of foreign policy, the United States and Germany during the last ten years have agreed as closely as any two nations in the West. In particular, the United States has consistently backed the Federal Republic's demand for re-unification with Eastern Germany by means of free general elections, and we have firmly resisted any attempts on the part of Russia to undermine the Western position in Berlin.

Overcompensation?

The major factor in bringing about this recent rapprochement between the United States and Germany has clearly been the pressure of events in the cold war. But in view of the American tendency to "overcompensate" (to use Mr. Warburg's term), i.e., to turn suddenly from blind hatred to equally blind love, one cannot help wondering whether our friendly attitude toward Germany today is not merely another example of the vacillation we have shown in our dealings with that country in the past. If this should be the case, then there is cause for concern among those Americans and Germans who view our present show of cordiality with some scepticism.

But there are also people today who believe, just as on earlier occasions when the two countries were on friendly terms, that such harmony is due to deeper causes. Ambassador Conant speaks of a "basic similarity between German and American attitudes," and of America's "latent pro-Germanism." Other observers point to the many personal contacts that have developed in recent years between citizens of both countries, growing out of the American occupation and the many official and private exchange programs. And they see these contacts as proof that some close affinity between the two nations does exist. There certainly have been occasions in the past years, notably during the Berlin air-lift, when mutual sympathy between Germans and Americans has been marked.

⁷ See John L. Snell, *Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma over Germany* (Hauser Press, New Orleans: 1959).

⁸ James P. Warburg, *Germany Key to Peace* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1953), p. xix.

But as our survey of the last 50 years has shown, such understanding and affinity have not kept America and Germany from twice going to war against each other. There are in reality fewer personal bonds between the two countries today than there were during World War I, when the large number of German-Americans did not prevent the United States government from intervention against Germany. How much, we must ask again, is the current era of good feeling due to "overcompensation," not only on the part of the United States but of Germany? A mutual feeling of guilt may be helpful in patching up differences among nations as among individuals. But how long, one wonders, do such reconciliations last?

This is not to deny that a "latent pro-Germanism" may exist in the United States. Our brief survey tends to support such an assumption. But rather than pin our hopes entirely on vague notions of "mutual respect" and "sympathetic understanding," it would seem preferable to base our attitude on a real knowledge of Germany's past and present. Dr. Conant rightly insists that we "need to try to understand the new Germany to which we are so firmly bound." It is from knowledge that true understanding grows, and it is on true understanding that lasting friendship is based. At present our knowledge of Germany's problems and peculiarities is woefully inadequate.

Lessons of the Past

There are other lessons we may learn from American-German relations in the past. United States policy towards Germany in two world wars has shown an unfortunate tendency to transform specific issues of national interest into general moral issues. We became involved in both wars for reasons of self-interest. But once we started to fight, we embarked on a crusade, not merely against the German government, but against the German people, their civilization, their tradi-

tion and even their character. This we did with such abandon that our sense of justice and proportion finally revolted and we "overcompensated," both after 1919 and after 1945. One lesson we should have learned by now is that in our foreign policy a mixture of realism and idealism, of reason and emotion, serves no useful purpose but merely helps to confuse our own people at home and our friends abroad. To guard against this unfortunate tendency of going to extremes, therefore, we should refrain in our current dealings with Germany from making sentimental professions of friendship that may some day conflict with our own interests. Otherwise when we decide to pursue these interests, we may again "overcompensate," this time in the opposite direction, turning from ardent friendship to violent antagonism.

Another lesson we may learn from the past concerns not only American-German but Anglo-German relations as well. The United States, at least during the last 50 years, has been very close to Great Britain. Relations between Germany and England, on the other hand, have been far from happy and are still not easy. Twice in this century the United States has become involved as Britain's partner in a war with Germany. Would it not seem a wise precaution, therefore, for the United States to try to prevent future Anglo-German conflicts? By serving as a bridge between Britain and Germany, the United States will contribute to the stability of Europe and thus will help to bring about an international climate in which American-German friendship can take firm roots. The hope for co-operation among the three "Germanic" nations has had its champions on both sides of the Atlantic since the days of Theodore Roosevelt, Cecil Rhodes and William II. It has foundered in the past on recurrent differences between Britain and Germany. The United States today is in an unusually favorable position to help mediate these differences.

"... Freedom under law is one of the most powerful ideas ever conceived by the mind of man. Its appeal will continue to grow in the uncommitted nations of the world. It has not been too long since many of these nations completed their successful struggle for independence. With national freedom there has arisen a great awareness of and interest in the concept of individual freedom."
—Attorney General of the U.S. William P. Rogers in an address before the American Bar Association's 82nd annual meeting, August 26, 1959.

"Western Germany's attitude and role in the European movement are . . . a natural consequence of her postwar situation. There is no doubt that of the three major nations in the Community of the 'Six,' Western Germany is the most European-minded."

Germany in the European Community

By CARL G. ANTHON

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WHEN President Eisenhower stepped off a Boeing 707 during his visit in Bonn in August, 1959, and addressed the German official party welcoming him at the airport, he said, "In my country the name Adenauer has become a symbol for the determination of the German people to remain free and strong. It shows that Germany has become during the first ten years of its existence an important factor in world politics instead of a mere object."

President Eisenhower's visit in Bonn—his first stop on his tour of Western capitals prior to the Khrushchev visit to the United States—marks indeed a highpoint in the foreign policy efforts of Western Germany. From the pariah status of an enemy-occupied power, the German Federal Republic in 10 years had climbed the tortuous path to full

sovereignty and equality in the Western community of free nations. She had become an important power—not a world power, to be sure—but a power to be reckoned with, to be wooed by her Western friends and neighbors, and to be relied upon for the cause of Western defense and freedom. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, riding in triumph with his august guest in an open Mercedes car past enthusiastic crowds, had ample reason to be gratified, for the spectacular transformation of Western Germany into a trusted neighbor and a respected power was very largely his handiwork. Any attempt to characterize the pattern of German foreign policy must, therefore, center around the personality of Adenauer, whom Winston Churchill has rightly called "the greatest German statesman since Bismarck."

The objectives of Western German foreign policy have remained remarkably firm since their formulation in 1949 and comprise in the main the following three: 1. to secure peace and freedom; 2. to end the partition of Germany; 3. to complete the unification of Europe. Or, more simply, "A free united Germany in a free and united Europe." That this was also the aspiration of the overwhelming majority of the German people is too obvious to require elaboration. But it was a task clearly beyond Germany's capabilities, and German political leaders offered various approaches toward its achievement. One was to cooperate wholeheartedly with the Western Allies, regain sovereignty and

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equality, and take a common stand with the West against the Communist East. Another was to try to come to a separate agreement with the Soviets and win reunification at a stipulated price, obviously a suicidal solution and anathema to most Germans. A third road might be the attempt to play off East against West to obtain maximum concessions for the benefit of a national revival. A fourth alternative seemed to be neutrality, a policy that was alluring to some Germans, particularly after the Soviets set the example of Austria.

Cooperation with the West

Adenauer, as everyone knows, chose the first of these routes and stuck by it through thick and thin, unperturbed by setbacks, criticisms, insults and injuries. Moreover, he chose a method of winning Western friendship and support that was vehemently challenged by the Social Democrats. It would of course be unjust and incorrect to maintain that the Socialists opposed Germany's identification with the West—they knew communism and fought it tenaciously, especially under their inspired leader, the late Karl Schumacher—but they opposed compromises and concessions to the Allies that implied inequality or even injustice.

Adenauer, on the other hand, maintained that Western Germany could hope to revive as a viable entity only with Western help. The first priority was, therefore, to win the confidence of the Western Allies through cooperation and unequivocal alignment with the West. Not resistance and stubborn bargaining, as Schumacher ardently urged, but only a policy of fulfillment would pave the way to universally coveted sovereignty and equality. Nor was a revival of the "Rapallo policy" possible or advisable, as three ex-chancellors of the Weimar Republic and their followers had naively recommended. For "*Bonn ist nicht Weimar*," as an intelligent observer of the German scene, the Swiss journalist F. R. Allemann, has aptly titled his excellent book on the young Federal Republic. Power positions had changed too radically to permit a resumption of such an independent, and in the context of contemporary developments, unscrupulous policy. The nightmare of a separate "deal" with Russia against the West which continued to

obsess a few sensation-ridden journalists was utterly devoid of a basis of fact or practical possibilities.

The Federal Republic is a child of the Cold War. As such its role and policies have constant implications for the Western struggle against the Communist danger. Vice-versa, the ups and downs of that struggle affect Western Germany's position and power from day to day. It is obvious that German aims and policies in the East and West are organically interrelated. Therefore her aims in Western Europe, her position in the Western European community, cannot be viewed in a vacuum; they derive their existence and validity from the over-all power position in which Western Germany found herself after World War II.

"European-Minded"

Western Germany's attitude and role in the European movement are, therefore, a natural consequence of her postwar situation. There is no doubt that of the three major nations in the Community of the "Six," Western Germany is the most European-minded. This is logical enough, for Germans have gone through a cathartic process sufficiently violent to realize that there is little future along the road of nationalism. A new Germany as part of a united Europe has a much better prospect—perhaps the only one—for a wholesome "national development." The break in Germany's history helps Germans to free themselves of traditional views and habits and to focus on a higher, supra-national aim, much more so than is possible for the British or French or even Italians. Germans realize better than their neighbors that *all* European nations have lost their freedom of action, have become small powers or "satellites" in their dependence on the United States, as that philosopher-diplomat, Pietro Quaroni, recently expressed it.

Having started from zero in 1945, Western Germany is psychologically better prepared to merge in a European community. She has little to lose and much to gain from such a development. In fact, as part of a strong, united Europe in which (by virtue of her demographic and economic strength) she would probably be the leading partner, she might eventually realize her most cherished, most vital aim: reunification.

By contrast, France and England are much more committed to traditional national interests. France, still the possessor of vast overseas territories, has the illusion of greatness, or at least she hopes to regain her former great power status. In any European community, France would expect to be the leader and she would furthermore expect the support of the other members for her colonial policies. That is more or less the price France exacted when entering the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). She insisted on the inclusion of her overseas territories, thereby implying support and requiring assistance for the development of these areas.

Great Britain is even less disposed to consider herself a small power. She is still, after all, part of a large Commonwealth and feels a primary commitment to it rather than to an amorphous, new-fangled European community. While she is ready to cooperate in the economic field (chiefly with regard to trade), she is definitely averse to committing herself politically on the continent. Her military participation in the Western European Union and the stationing there for an indefinite period of the better half of her army already marks a revolutionary departure from her traditional policy. But, then, we live in a revolutionary age and revolutionary methods are required for survival, a lesson which Britain, too, is gradually comprehending. Actually, Britain cannot really be expected to feel much enthusiasm for a united European community on the continent which, with a population of over 160 million, would easily eclipse her present position as second power in the West.

In Western Germany, all the major political parties, the unions, and above all, the youth organizations, supported the ideal of European unity. However, the Socialists quarrelled with the Chancellor over the methods and timetable to be followed. They felt that German reunification should come first; a premature, too close association with a Western European group, they maintained, might jeopardize the chances of reunification. Moreover, they were purists insisting on all or nothing. They were opposed to a "Little Europe" and vehemently criticized the integration schemes as being discriminatory against Germany. Thus in 1949, at the

height of the debate over the Petersberg agreement and the Ruhr Statute which it included (placing Germany's Ruhr industries under international authority), Schumacher hurled the insulting epithet, "Chancellor of the Allies!" at Adenauer, who was trying to take the long view to reach Germany's objectives.

Konrad Adenauer had in fact espoused the European idea ever since the early 1920's. A devout and conservative Catholic, he was profoundly convinced of the need for Christian solidarity against communism. Catholic nations like France and Italy seemed natural partners in this common struggle even though many anticlerical Frenchmen and Italians viewed the allegedly clerical regime of the "old man" with misgivings. But in addition to this strong ideological component of Adenauer's political thinking, there were also good political and strategic reasons for supporting European union. By participating in the various European schemes, even with hardships and discriminations, Germany could gradually throw off certain fetters of the occupation rule and achieve sovereignty and security. However, the basic hope and intention of Adenauer in joining the embryonic, fragmentary European organizations was that they might lead to a concrete, full-fledged political community.

Germany in E.C.S.C.

The European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.), the first of the "functional" communities Germany entered, illustrates the various interests which motivated German participation. It might be argued, of course, that the Federal Republic had no option in the matter and that she *had* to accept some kind of international control over her coal and steel resources. But to the Germans the French plan for a coal and steel pool came as a pleasant surprise, a welcome opportunity to enter a respectable club with France, her former enemy, and at the same time to eliminate the shackles which the Allies had imposed on German industrial production.

Schuman's plan—actually Jean Monnet's—seemed to implement the dream project of a Franco-German political union which Adenauer had once outlined in an interview with Kingsbury Smith. But the plan was also consonant with German industrial inter-

ests and with the idea of free competition as propounded with spectacular success by Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard. The negotiations for the Schuman Plan were given impetus, moreover, by the Korean War which harshly revealed the need for European industrial strength and—even more important—the need for a German military contribution to Western defense. It was largely French fears of a revival of German industrial and military potential that “sold” Frenchmen on the Schuman Plan. Like the subsequent European Defense Community (E.D.C.) this was a device for the neutralization of German resources and power.

The Social Democrats, as was not necessarily to be expected, denounced the plan and the government for supporting it. To Schumacher the plan was “capitalistic, cartellistic, conservative, and clerical,” a “super-state of managers,” which would lead to a “nature preserve of European vestigial capitalism.”¹ He opposed even more stridently Germany’s entry in the Council of Europe as provided for by the treaty because it was coupled with the condition that the Saar should also be admitted as a separate associate member. This, he warned, would mean the loss of the Saar and would compromise further the chances for reunification. To Adenauer and his Christian Democrats, however, this was a minor and, quite possibly, a temporary evil whereas the E.C.S.C. represented the first solid step on the road to Franco-German reconciliation.

The expectations which Germany and its partners placed in E.C.S.C. have been fulfilled only in part. The economic results were, on the whole, gratifying, for trade and production in coal and steel have expanded considerably since 1952, and the liberalized movement of goods and capital in these areas has contributed to a rise in production efficiency and to a higher standard of living among the workers (the German unions, incidentally, have supported E.C.S.C. in contrast to their political brethren-in-arms, the Social Democrats).

Naturally there have been criticisms and complaints but they are neither fundamental nor general. German producers have criticized E.C.S.C. for excessive “dirigisme,” cumbersome, restrictive policies and favoritism towards France and Belgium. Others

were happy with E.C.S.C.’s more constructive policy regarding mergers after the Allies had sought radically to de-cartellize German big industry. In general, it seems that producers have profited from the wider market and have supported plans for an expansion of the common market in coal and steel to a general common market.

The formation of the European Defense Community (E.D.C.) was influenced by the same political considerations in France and Germany as those that led to the Schuman plan. Although E.D.C., the plan to integrate the military forces of the Six, met with ignominious defeat in the French parliament, it is not devoid of significance in the context of Germany’s recovery and rehabilitation. Chancellor Adenauer greeted the Plevin Plan—again a product of French initiative—with the same enthusiasm as the Schuman Plan and more or less for similar political and ideological reasons. If the French invented the plan (after an original proposal by Winston Churchill in the Council of Europe) to neutralize German military power, the Germans saw in this arrangement a possibility of achieving complete sovereignty as a *quid pro quo*.

At the same time, Adenauer sincerely believed the plan for a supranational army would logically lead to full political integration. “. . . Can it be imagined,” the Chancellor said in an address in New York in April, 1953, “that the six participating countries [of the prospective E.D.C.] would willingly send their sons and daughters to serve in this European Army unless a fundamental unity existed in their foreign policies? The establishment of a six-nation Defense Community must lead to a unification—at least to a *rapprochement*—in the field of foreign policy. Thus the end of this development appears to be the creation of a European Political Community.”² It was a measure of the greatness of Adenauer’s statesmanship after the defeat of E.D.C. at the hands of the French government and parliament, that he bore no grudge, no chip on his shoulder, but declared only a few days later,

An understanding between France and Germany is the foundation, the necessary prerequisite—

¹ Quoted by Hubertus Prinz zu Löwenstein, *Deutschlands Schicksal 1945–1957* (Bonn, Athonaum Verlag, 1957), p. 195.

² Quoted by Arnold J. Zurcher, *The Struggle to Unite Europe 1940–1958* (New York University Press, 1958), p. 96.

site, of any European integration. The great historic design of European integration will not be killed by a vote on the procedural handling of the E.D.C. treaty in one of the parliaments involved.³

The failure of E.D.C. had tragic implications for Europe and specifically for the German Federal Republic. The daring plan for a federated political community which Adenauer and other "strong Europeans" had so ardently championed automatically died of paralysis. Such a plan had been worked out almost parallel with negotiations for E.D.C. by a committee of the Assembly of the Council of Europe under the chairmanship of Heinrich von Brentano, Adenauer's close associate. It was hoped that this political community would replace the separate organs of the several supranational organizations, including the new E.D.C., and function as a single supranational community that would eventually develop into a federal government. The failure of this second post-war attempt to achieve European federation (the first was in 1949) was a bitter blow to the European movement.

But for Germany, which among the Six had supported E.D.C. most vigorously, the failure of the European Army plan meant retrogression in political development. Contingent upon ratification of E.D.C. were the so-called Contractual Agreements, peace treaties of a sort between the German Federal Republic and Britain, France and the United States. These agreements, signed in Bonn in May, 1953, were to end the occupation status of Western Germany and restore full sovereignty if and when she had become a member of E.D.C. This explains in part the zeal with which Adenauer and the Christian Democrats supported E.D.C., even though Germany's position in it would have been decidedly inferior. Thus, through the action of the French parliament Western Germany was left in occupation status for an indefinite period and was prohibited from re-arming. It is not surprising therefore, that not only Germany, but also the other governments who had already ratified E.D.C. and, above all, the United States, which had warned France of an "agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy" if E.D.C. were

not realized, immediately sought for a *modus vivendi* that would accomplish German re-armament within an acceptable framework.

The resulting compromise, the so-called Western European Union (W.E.U.), was a pallid imitation of E.D.C. and need not be discussed in this context. However, W.E.U. fortunately broke the stalemate, provided for Germany's re-armament and admission to Nato, and terminated the Allied occupation (except for Berlin). It did not create a European Army or a supra-national organization for common defense. Each of the seven partners (the Six plus Britain) were to contribute national contingents to Nato and thus the very thing France had feared most, the resuscitation of a German national army, came into being. It was not what German leaders had wished or worked for and, as was to be expected, a wave of disillusionment swept over Germany. The earlier enthusiasm for European integration waned, and criticism of supra-national experiments like the Coal and Steel Community mounted noticeably. Many Germans began to question France's motives as well as the value of her partnership in a European community.

The Saar question

One of the conditions the French government had stipulated in connection with ratification of E.D.C. was a satisfactory settlement of the Saar Question. Thus, when the treaties for W.E.U. were to be signed in Paris in October, 1954, Premier Mendès-France had managed to attach a "rider" to the agreements, a provision to "Europeanize" the Saar. This plan represented a modification of a proposal by Dr. van der Goes van Naters, a Dutch representative on the Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg. Essentially it provided for an autonomous Saar state under a European commissioner appointed by the Council of Ministers of W.E.U. and for a gradual diminution of France's special economic rights. To be sure, it was a provisional arrangement until the conclusion of a final peace treaty, but its application would no doubt have meant the *de facto* severance of the Saar from Germany.

Adenauer was forced to agree to this Saar Statute (on which there was to be a referendum by the Saar population) because he did

³ Quoted in *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy*, edited by Hans Speier and Phillips Davison (Row, Peterson and Co., Evanston, Ill., 1957), p. 75.

not wish to jeopardize the Paris "package" deal. But again it may be safely assumed that he saw in it another possibility of setting up a European core, a miniature experiment in European government. On the eve of the referendum in the autumn of 1955, Adenauer even counseled the Saarlanders to vote for the Saar Statute, for Europeanization, an attitude which his opponents denounced as weakness and lack of patriotism. But the "European" solution for the Saar fell through when the Saar plebiscite resulted in its rejection by a majority of two to one.

Faced with this decision by the people, the French government, now under Guy Mollet, proceeded promptly and loyally to liquidate the Saar dispute in the spirit of the plebiscite. The puppet government of Heinrich Hoffman resigned and new elections gave a pro-German coalition a 64 per cent majority. The way was now clear for a "German" solution. It was precisely Adenauer's loyalty in living up to his part of the Saar agreement that prompted the French government to fulfill its part of the bargain, although the author of the Saar Statute, Mendès-France, chose to oppose fulfillment. The Saar treaty signed at Luxembourg on October 27, 1956, provided for the reunification of the Saar with Western Germany after a transitional period of two years.

It represented a give-and-take for both partners. For France it meant that the German coal and steel potential which would have been somewhat neutralized had the Saar remained outside of Germany was now weighted overwhelmingly in favor of Germany. Perhaps the recent development of oil deposits in the Sahara and the growing importance of oil as fuel helped France to make this decision. In any event, it meant a very considerable sacrifice of rights and resources to which most Frenchmen felt their country was entitled as a result of war damages inflicted by Nazi Germany. Germany, too, had to make heavy concessions. France obtained rights to some 66 million tons of coal, the undisturbed continuation of French business enterprises and banks in the Saar, and the continuation of liberal trade and tariff regulations which, in effect, meant a miniature "common market." Above all, Germany was obligated to carry out the canalization of the Moselle river, a project

long cherished by France that would cheapen the transport of Lorraine iron ore to the steel mills in the Ruhr. On July 5, 1959, the period of transition was declared terminated—somewhat ahead of schedule—and the Saar officially rejoined the German body politic.

With the liquidation of the Saar issue a century-old bone of contention between France and Germany was removed and the way was cleared for Franco-German co-operation. The traditional French drive for the "national frontiers" along the Rhine has thus been abandoned. The new Germany France is facing today is, of course, very different from that of the days of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Germany is split up, Prussia has disappeared, and colonial rivalry has been eliminated. South German liberalism, deeply inspired by the French Revolution, has been able to assert itself in far greater measure than before. One has only to think of that grand old Swabian liberal, Theodor Heuss, whose warm humanity, wit and wisdom have helped to earn for the young republic an enormous quantum of respect and friendship.

The advent of de Gaulle as prime minister and subsequently as president did not, contrary to expectations and fears from some quarters, change this good relationship. De Gaulle, perhaps more than anyone else, symbolizes that almost miraculous change of French attitude toward Germany during the last 15 years. Like most French statesmen and generals since the time of Richelieu, de Gaulle stood for the "natural frontiers," "la grande nation," and by force of logic, for a weak Germany. An integral nationalist, he consistently opposed supra-national European schemes that would involve surrender of a shred of French sovereignty. But the Communist menace seems to have convinced the proud and somewhat stubborn general that France cannot "go it alone" and hope to maintain her security or to regain that great power status he so craves for France. Three times, in rapid succession, at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, Bad Kreuznach, and Paris, Adenauer and de Gaulle have met in utmost privacy, mainly to coordinate their positions vis-a-vis Moscow and Big Four talks. Impelled by similar convictions, these two leaders, strong conservatives, defenders of the faith, probably discovered a mutuality

of interests and a certain liking for each other.

Of course, two men alone cannot create Franco-German friendship. It is significant that French foreign policy with regard to Germany is still in the hands of men dedicated to Franco-German cooperation and European union, men like foreign minister Couve de Murville (formerly French ambassador in Bonn), Guy Mollet, a veteran champion of the European cause, and leading civil servants like the secretary-general in the foreign ministry, M. Joxe. For ministers come and go, particularly in France, but the permanent bureaucracy assures a certain continuum in policies. Not formal treaties of friendship, but countless working contacts of statesmen and politicians, church leaders and intellectuals, youth and union leaders are contributing to the building of one of the most positive phenomena in our troubled period, friendship between two neighboring peoples formerly kept apart by a century of conflict.

The Common Market

It is still too early to assess the implications for Germany of the two most recently created supra-national communities, the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and the European Atomic Community (Euratom). There is no doubt that this further step in European integration had wide support in Germany, even though the immediate effects were uncertain. The agreements were ratified in the Bundestag on July 5, 1957, by an overwhelming majority including the Social Democrats, who in this case reversed their previous attitude to piecemeal, functional integration. Since the inauguration of E.E.C. in January, 1958, trade volume has not only expanded among the six partners, but there has been a noticeable improvement in the economies of all O.E.E.C. countries. To be sure, there is some criticism and dissatisfaction, and this is unavoidable in view of temporary dislocations and discrepancies in the rhythm of adjustments to countless changes. To Germans, for instance, there is at present a strong feeling that Germany seems to be making most of the sacrifices in the form of advance trade and tariff liberalization and generous contributions to development funds, a large amount of which are

for the benefit of French overseas territories. But the significance of E.E.C. does not lie only in the economic field. Again and again German leaders have stressed the political importance of E.E.C. This is true, above all, of Adenauer who in a recent speech before foreign press correspondents declared, "By means of E.E.C. we hope to achieve a political integration in Western Europe, because only thus can Western Europe be secured against the pressure from the East."⁴

But the creation of a common market among the Six (the main feature of E.E.C.) led also to the formation of a rival group of seven nations under the leadership of Britain. These nations of the "Little Free Trade Area" (so called in contradistinction to the proposed European Free Trade Zone) fear the discriminatory effects of E.E.C., at the same time feeling unable for political reasons to associate themselves with the Six. Consequently there is imminent danger that Western European nations, instead of uniting, are falling apart in two separate, competing blocs.

Few persons fear this more than Germany's dynamic Ludwig Erhard, who strongly urged E.E.C. authorities to come to a friendly agreement with the Seven. In this he is stoutly supported by German industrialists who fear the possible effects of economic isolation. It is evident that in this question Adenauer and his Economics Minister do not see eye to eye. For while Erhard stresses the economic consequences of an excessively rigid policy of E.E.C. toward outsiders, Adenauer sees the danger of a possible weakening of the political potential of E.E.C. by making too many concessions to the Seven. Since Professor Hallstein, the president of the E.E.C. Commission, is a very close associate of Adenauer, it is likely that the political character of that community will not be diluted. On the contrary, indications are that, with the likely adoption of the Wigny Plan, the further consolidation of the E.E.C., politically as well as economically, will be accelerated.

A "Third Force"?

While many voices have been heard in

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⁴ *Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, October 16, 1959.

As this specialist notes, "... the two World Wars certainly had different impacts" on Germany. During World War II, the civilian was reached by the enemy and taught an unforgettable lesson about the horrors of war." Other contrasts between 1919 and 1945 are delineated here.

Germany after Two World Wars

By FELIX E. HIRSCH

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IT WAS in the late afternoon of November 9, 1918, the day of the German revolution. A few hours earlier, the Republic had been proclaimed rather unexpectedly in the heart of Berlin by Philipp Scheidemann, one of the most dynamic Social Democratic parliamentarians, and the masses of workingmen gathered in front of the Reichstag building had cheered him loudly. The last imperial cabinet, headed by Prince Max of Baden, a liberal cousin of William II, had resigned. He had turned over the reins of government to Friedrich Ebert, leader of the moderate Social Democrats, the ablest German statesman to rise from the ranks of labor. Now the Prince came to bid good-bye to his successor. We have Max' account of this historic conversation. Ebert asked him warmly to stay on as Regent, but the Prince felt unable to accept under the circumstances. After they had parted, Max turned once more at the door and said: "Herr Ebert, I put the German Reich close to your heart." The new Chancellor replied: "I gave two sons for this Reich."

This brief episode illustrates better than any lengthy description the fact that there was continuity between the Empire that had lost the war and the Republican government that took over in the hour of defeat. Different from 1945, there was no political vacuum in 1918. Actually, the revolution was only the last logical step in a sequence of developments that had started in the spring of 1917. At that time, the Emperor and his advisers, deeply disturbed by the downfall of the Russian monarchy, had begun to promise parliamentary reforms. Step by step, politicians of the liberal parties and of the Catholic Center had assumed key positions in

Berlin, while Hindenburg and Ludendorff were still in supreme control of the armed forces. Finally, when the news from the front had become more and more alarming, William II had swallowed his pride and appointed Social Democrats such as Scheidemann to the cabinet, although he despised their party.

The November Revolution

It is therefore not surprising that the revolution did not cause the kind of convulsion we associate otherwise with this term. Of

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course, there were mass demonstrations and wild orations; stones were thrown, some shots were fired, and officers were deprived of their epaulettes, but there was little bloodshed. I remember promenading on the Kurfürstendamm, Berlin's equivalent of Fifth Avenue, in the afternoon of November 9; I noticed some minor incidents, but they were of a rather harmless kind. Is it not characteristic, that no reactionary politician lost his life on the day the Hohenzollern Monarchy ended its 503-year reign? Only one of William II's devoted personal friends, Albert Ballin, Jewish director general of the Hamburg America Line, quietly took an overdose of sleeping pills and could not be saved. Otherwise, most people belonging to the middle and upper classes accepted the change realistically, whether they liked the "Reds" or not. Their traditional loyalty to the crown faded away after they had learned in detail how William II had left his army and crossed the Dutch frontier. Many of the prominent liberal newspapers indicated at once their willingness to support the Republic. The bourgeois parties, except for the Center, soon changed their names to streamline themselves for the new situation and to escape responsibility for errors which some of their leaders had committed.

In the meantime a provisional government including the Social Democrats and, for a while, also their more radical brethren, the "Independents," tried to run the affairs of the young Republic. The central authority was in the hands of six "People's Commissars," among whom Ebert clearly stood out as a man of moderation, sagacity and determination. He made discreet arrangements with General Groener, Ludendorff's successor, which assured that the remnants of the army would march home in good order. It was also due to his superior statesmanship that the German Communists, who were led, at first, by such firebrands as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, did not gain an opportunity during the winter of 1918-1919 to wrest control of the government from the moderate Socialists.

Friedrich Ebert has never been given his due by American observers for his historic achievement in those critical months. He prevented Germany from following the Russian pattern of 1917. Stubbornly overcom-

ing all obstacles he saw to it that a National Assembly was soon elected in a truly democratic fashion. Social Democrats, Center and Liberal Democrats, the three major republican parties, gained a heavy majority at the polls. From then on, communism did not pose a serious threat to the central government, even though it reared its head occasionally in certain states, especially Saxony. The National Assembly included a large number of unusually able and some brilliant men and women, among them quite a bit of new talent. Many of the debates, especially in the early months, were conducted on a high level, reminding the listener of the oratory in the *Paulskirche* Parliament of 1848, a treat rarely offered in the *Bundestag* (Federal Diet) of Bonn.

The Armistice

The day before the Emperor abdicated, Marshall Foch had grimly received the German commission which hoped to negotiate terms for the cessation of hostilities. Three days later the Armistice was signed; Foch had been unwilling to make concessions. In a way, the roots of many later troubles for the Republic are right here. The delegation should have been headed by a high army officer, like Hindenburg himself. This would have symbolized to the German people the complete military defeat that made acceptance of Foch's harsh terms inevitable. But, unfortunately, the illusion had prevailed in Berlin and in army headquarters, that a civilian would be accorded a better reception by the Allied high command. The man chosen for the thankless task, Matthias Erzberger, an overly ambitious Center politician, paid with his life for having signed the hateful document; he was made a scapegoat by the rabid Nationalists and murdered by fore-runners of the Nazis in 1921.

Erzberger's signature helped those anti-republican propagandists who later blamed Germany's disaster on the machinations of unpatriotic civilians. The army, they said, had been undefeated on the battlefield; it had been stabbed in the back by unscrupulous "Red" politicians and their bourgeois cronies. Such vicious accusations would eventually not even stop at the door of Friedrich Ebert; his life was shortened by a campaign of calumnies against him. In retro-

spect we might say it was a calamity that the Germans did not learn then the lesson of what total war really means. Of course, there had been terrible casualties; the flower of Germany's young manhood rested in the cemeteries of Northern France and Flanders. Starvation had taken its toll, for the English blockade had proved to be effective in the long run. But the horrors of war had not been driven home in other ways. The Germans had fought on foreign soil; few bombs had been dropped on their own cities. Finally, after the war only the Rhineland was occupied by the Allies. Had the Western democracies marched into the heart of Germany, the deeper meaning of defeat might have become clear even to those super-patriots who preferred to accuse their fellow countrymen of treason to facing the realities.

Just as the proclamation of the Republic and the signing of the Armistice had been separated by only two days, so another fateful coincidence occurred in June, 1919. The final struggle over the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty aroused passions in the National Assembly at the time when the new basic law was taking shape. The constitution of Weimar represented the cooperative efforts of an outstanding group of parliamentarians, professors and political thinkers. While we can see the serious flaws in the document after 40 years more clearly than its authors did in 1919, we should not forget that, at the least, its articles devoted to the rights of man were couched in forceful language and superior to the parallel passages in the Bonn constitution.

The man in the street, however, cared but little for these polished formulations at a moment when his country was subjected to a peace instrument that contained so many harsh, if not obviously unjust and intolerable clauses. It was at this point that also many luminaries of the German academic world, liberals like Max Weber and Hermann Oncken, rose in patriotic indignation against the Western allies and turned away from Woodrow Wilson in bitter disappointment.

When the war was in its final stages, the figure of the American President loomed large on the horizon. Many Germans respected his lofty concepts and dignified pronouncements. They thought much more highly of him than of their adversary in

World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose "unconditional surrender" policy even Hitler's sworn enemies found hard to swallow. German public sentiment in 1918 had been increasingly in favor of the Fourteen Points. There was even some feeling in favor of a League of Nations, because intellectuals recalled that Immanuel Kant had wrestled in his famous pamphlet on *Perpetual Peace* with the same fundamental problems Wilson hoped to solve in his Covenant.

German Public Opinion 1919

It was a tragic misfortune that most American and English statesmen did not realize the state of German public opinion in late 1918 and early 1919. There existed a reservoir of good will which should not have been disregarded. The Allied leaders, obviously not well informed, failed to understand the character and the aims of the German democratic government. True, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the new Foreign Minister, *looked* like a Junker, but he was a staunch liberal, as everybody knew, and so were many of his associates. The delegation which he took with him to Versailles consisted of many men of good will, including such a dyed-in-the-wool pacifist as Professor Walther Schücking. But they could never establish real contact with the Allies, except for a brief, ill-phrased and ill-fated speech which Brockdorff was permitted to make.

Although Professor C. K. Webster had just written a learned history of the Congress of Vienna for the benefit of the British Foreign office, it never dawned on the English delegates or their American colleagues why Metternich, Castlereagh and Alexander I had been so successful in 1814-1815. The main reason was that they had permitted Talleyrand, shrewd spokesman of the vanquished, to participate in drawing up the peace settlement whose essence was then to last for 99 years. Had there been at least a minimum of honest negotiation among equals and some attempt at a reasonable compromise in Versailles, the world might have been spared the bloody Hitler tyranny and a second, more terrible holocaust. Instead, the Allies forced the reluctant National Assembly in Weimar to accede at the last moment to the demand for signing the Treaty. But this was accom-

plished at the price of alienating millions of Germans from the new republican order.

Stresemann and Adenauer

Even after the final humiliation, the German government could not count on a more sympathetic treatment. For four years, while France under Poincaré enjoyed her last spell of hegemony in Europe, the republican statesmen in Berlin were harassed by unending problems of reparations. The bottom was reached in the summer of 1923, when, due to monetary demands created by the Ruhr occupation, inflation ran unchecked and the dollar quotations at the stock exchange rose to astronomical figures. In this hour of despair, Ebert called upon Gustav Stresemann, astute and courageous leader of the moderate liberals, to save the situation. Stresemann's chancellorship lasted only 100 days. But although at one point even this perennial optimist had the nightmare of *finis Germaniae*, he piloted the Weimar Republic out of its gravest crisis. A sound new currency was created; several attempts at destroying the central authority were squelched, including Hitler's notorious Beerhall *putsch*; the door was opened to an economic and political understanding with the Anglo-Saxon powers. While he never regained the chancellorship, Stresemann stayed on as minister of foreign affairs through the six years that remained to him; had sickness not felled him prematurely, he might have run for the Presidency after Hindenburg's first term was over and changed the course of history. In any case, Stresemann led his country from success to success. The Dawes Plan, the Locarno Pact and Germany's entry into the League of Nations were among his greatest triumphs. Only seven years after Clemenceau's hour of revenge in Versailles, Stresemann and his French colleague Aristide Briand had become personal friends. At their famous tête-à-tête in Thoiry (near Geneva), they had visions of intimate collaboration between Germany and France. These visions have become a reality only in the era of Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle.

Stresemann and Adenauer belonged to the same generation. However, there was no bond of friendship between them; they did not see eye to eye on some crucial issues.

Their periods of national leadership were separated by the Third Reich. As we compare their accomplishments, we can say that both brought about miraculous changes in a remarkably short time. Is President Eisenhower's recent visit to Bonn not symbolic of this turn of events? The same General who entered Germany as a conqueror in 1945 came this time as a friend, greeted enthusiastically by hundreds of thousands of citizens. He felt he had to consult with the Federal Chancellor before he called on the British Prime Minister and the French President. Could any gesture indicate more clearly that West Germany has attained a key position in European power politics?

As Adenauer accompanied his guest from Washington through the crowded streets of Bonn, his memory may have turned back to a trip he took in an American jeep in March, 1945. Two United States officers had come to his home and prevailed on him to resume his position as Lord Mayor of Cologne, from which the Nazis had ousted him in 1933. It was a sad homecoming. More than half of the 59,000 houses in town had been completely destroyed; only 300 were unharmed. As Adenauer's biographer, Paul Weymar, tells us, there was neither gas nor electricity nor water available; neither tramways nor cars could make their way through the mountain of rubble. The people who had stayed in this once beautiful metropolis of the Rhineland eked out a subhuman existence in the cellars. Cologne was badly off, but some other cities had been hit even harder. In 1949, when I revisited Germany, I still came through many ghost-towns. Attractive cities that I had known before, like Cassel, Darmstadt and Würzburg, had been reduced to ruins. Hallowed centers of German culture, such as Frankfurt and Nuremberg, had not fared much better.

In this respect, the two World Wars certainly had different impacts. This time, the civilian was reached by the enemy and taught an unforgettable lesson about the horrors of war. In the meantime, most cities have been rebuilt; often they have risen from the ashes more beautiful than before. But a nation that had such a harrowing experience as the saturation bombings of the last war years, must have been cured of wanton aggressiveness and will not easily fall prey to another

wild-eyed demagogue like Hitler or Goebbels. Remembering the nationalistic attitude of my fellow students in Heidelberg about 1920, I was pleased to find on my post-war journeys that German youth today looks beyond the frontiers. While the "Pan-European" movement was not taken very seriously in the 1920's, a genuine European spirit can now be sensed in many places, especially among university students.

The spring of 1945 taught millions of Germans yet another lesson. A nation that acquiesces when its leaders ruthlessly transplant or murder millions of innocent people will not go unpunished. The fate that Hitler and Himmler meted out to Jews and Poles and Russians eventually befell the Germans who had lived for many generations in Eastern Central Europe. In March and April, 1945, millions of people fled from their homes when the Russian armies approached; impoverished, starving Western Germany had to absorb these penniless refugees and expellees. This created many hardships. Nothing like this mass migration occurred after World War I; it dwarfed all the population exchanges that had then been organized in the Balkans. In a way, this relocation was perhaps a blessing in disguise, because it led to a loosening of rigid regional traditions in some German states.

A Political Vacuum

When Hitler ended his life in the bunker of the Chancellery on April 30, he thought he had assured the continuity of his government by appointing Grand Admiral Doenitz as his successor. But any political analyst could then see that no workable solution had been provided. How could the Allied leaders be expected to negotiate with the naval commander who had conducted the pernicious submarine campaign against England? What trust could they put in him, even though he had never been a member of Hitler's inner circle? The tragedy growing out of the abortive Putsch of July, 1944, could only then be fully realized. When Count Stauffenberg's bomb had failed to kill the *Führer*, there was no limit to vengeance. Hitler in his rage saw to it that all potential leaders of an opposition were eradicated, be they Junker officers, diplomats, civil servants, intellectuals or trade unionists. To these

irreplaceable losses must be added those caused by his earlier acts of brutal persecution. Part of the political élite had been driven into exile. Much of the rest had ended in the concentration camps. Many talented members of the younger generation had lost their lives on the battlefields of Europe and Africa; others who had been unscrupulous enough to make careers in the Nazi party were now hopelessly compromised. Therefore, a political vacuum resulted when the Third Reich collapsed. It would take a long time to rebuild a leadership group capable of running a national government. The fact that some democratic party organizations emerged soon after Hitler's demise is noteworthy, but they could assume only limited responsibilities at first.

Ebert's first thought when he took office on November 9, 1918, was to call for the election of a national assembly. This was held within ten weeks after the revolution, and in February, 1919, the new parliament settled down to its arduous labors. In 1945, however, nobody could have similarly ambitious plans. Indeed, it took more than four years until a real parliament for the three Western Zones was elected and a new political order established. While some of the men and women assembled in Bonn looked down on the "failure" of Weimar, actually most of the statesmen who are responsible for the emergence of a strong Federal Republic in the last decade had done much of their life's work before Hitler came to power. Federal President Heuss and Luebke, Chancellor Adenauer, the leaders of the Social Democratic opposition, Schumacher and Ollenhauer, and, last but not least, Berlin's fighting Lord Mayor Reuter, were prominent figures in the Weimar Republic. Only Economics Minister Erhard, Socialist parliamentarian Carlo Schmid, and Mayor Brandt are "new-comers" of note on the national scene. There is still a disheartening lack of young political talent as we enter the 1960's.

In the cultural sphere, the situation was not much more encouraging. Old professors had to spring into the breach, when Hitler and Goebbels departed and the universities were to be reopened without the scholars who had compromised themselves and their institutions by unashamedly embracing the Nazi creed. It fell partly to octogenarians

such as the physicist Max Planck, the historian Friedrich Meinecke and the sociologist Alfred Weber to restore faith in German scholarship. Of course, many somewhat younger men helped in this noble endeavor, but the best among them, like the philosopher Karl Jaspers, the physicist Otto Hahn, and the historian Gerhard Ritter, to mention but three, are now also in their seventies. When German professors talk candidly to a friend from the United States, they readily admit that the intellectual vigor and the pulsating academic life that were so evident even in the early turbulent period of the Weimar republic are largely lacking now. The universities are more crowded than they were in 1919, but high enrollment figures do not necessarily guarantee a new golden age of scholarship.

Lack of Foresight

Finally, a word about Germany's international position right after World War II. Can anybody blame the Allied leaders for feeling that severe punishment was deserved by the nation that had followed a madman

for a dozen years and had tolerated an unending chain of crimes against humanity? Harsh measures were amply justified, but the hatred for Nazism and all it stood for should not have misled American statesmen into sharing in decisions which, in the long run, were harmful to the peace of Europe and to our own best interests. It was unwise and unrealistic from the vantage point of the Western democracies to support a division of Germany that enabled Soviet Russia to move into the heart of Europe. Students of history could see then that the whole four power agreement was unworkable and that it could lead only to serious complications and conflicts, especially as far as the status of Berlin was concerned. The United States paid heavily for the errors of 1919, but the harm done in 1945 by lack of foresight was immeasurably greater. This is a lesson we should remember, even though we may be justly proud of the remarkable record the American occupation forces (and especially our spokesmen General Lucius Clay, John J. McCloy and James B. Conant) have made in Germany since V-E day.

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Europe advocating the creation of a "Third Force" in the form of a strong, united Europe, it is most unlikely that such an entity, should it ever materialize, would range itself in opposition to both super-powers, the U.S.S.R. and the United States. De Gaulle's France may welcome a bit less American influence and weight in Europe—and for this reason she is perhaps more disposed to cooperate with Germany—but Adenauer's Germany and Macmillan's Britain will, certainly wish to continue in close alliance and cooperation with the United States. After all, European integration has been an important part of American foreign policy, be-

ginning with the Marshall Plan and O.E.E.C. down to the Schuman Plan, E.C.C., and the Common Market. German party leaders, including Socialists, warmly supported the "Acheson Plan" for a stronger and more comprehensive Atlantic community in which the European community would play a major role. Of one thing one may be sure: Western Germany has learned with finality that she cannot pursue an independent policy and she will continue to seek close and active alignment with her Western neighbors, and above all, with the United States. Shorn of all sophomoric illusions of grandeur, she is ready to graduate to an upper grade on the supra-national level.

"... More than one billion needy people require real advances in education, health facilities and living standards. There is an understandable ferment among them—an intense dissatisfaction with their present lot and an increased determination to improve that lot. They must have greater technical assistance in all fields, large amounts of investment capital, and wider opportunities to trade.

"Since all of us outside the Iron Curtain want such progress to be achieved in freedom, the highly industrialized free nations must . . . provide the needed help. . . ."—*President of the U.S. Dwight D. Eisenhower, September 10, 1959.*

"... It is apparent that there is still fear, articulate and inarticulate, among West Germany's allies as well as her enemies, that the revival of German armed strength may yet be regretted." German military strength is evaluated in considerable detail.

German Rearmament and the European Balance

By ALLAN S. NANES

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IN THE last few years we have become accustomed to hearing a great deal about the economic miracle of Germany, and indeed the revival of the German economy from the shambles left by World War II has been little short of miraculous. Recently, however, a development has been going forward in West Germany with little fanfare that may affect the world picture as much, if not more, than her economic recovery. That development is the rebuilding of German military power with the blessings, ironically enough, of Germany's erstwhile conquerors.

This military build up was begun most unpromisingly. The decision to rearm was not Germany's, and in the immediate post-war atmosphere it hardly could have been.

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Instead, faced with overt Communist aggression in Korea, and fearing a Soviet attack against Western Europe, the United States decided, in 1950, that the rearmament of West Germany was a necessity. Our allies went along, although without any great enthusiasm. However when the United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, suggested that ten German divisions be raised and placed under Nato command, this was too much for the French. Their response was to propose the European Defense Community, a device whereby German troops could be raised as part of an integrated European army that would be placed at the disposal of Nato. A treaty was actually drawn up to this effect, and signed by the foreign ministers of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. But then France began to have second thoughts about German membership in this supranational military community. The paradoxical upshot was that the French Assembly refused to ratify the European Defense Community Treaty, and the whole project collapsed.

To fill the yawning gap thus created conferences were held in London and Paris in 1954 which resulted in a series of agreements whereby West Germany was restored to full sovereignty and accepted as a partner in Nato, allied forces were permitted to remain in Germany for purposes of mutual defense, and Germany agreed to raise an army which would be placed under over-all Nato control. To cap the climax, these agreements were ratified in due course, even by the French, who thus agreed to the very thing that they

supposedly feared most of all, the creation of a German national army.

Once the international arrangements for rearmament had been made, the German federal government was faced with a series of internal problems that had to be overcome before such rearmament could actually get under way. In the first place, before any conscription law could be passed, the Bonn Constitution had to be amended to confer this power on the *Bundestag*. Such an amendment was enacted on February 26, 1954. Once conscription was legally possible, the Bonn authorities faced a lack of enthusiasm, not to say downright hostility, on the part of German youth of military age, who attributed Germany's downfall to past martial adventures. The slogan *ohne mich*—without me—typified this attitude. In addition, the Social Democratic party, which bitterly opposed Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's foreign policy as tying Germany too closely to the West, saw rearmament as the realization of its worst fears.

As a result of this opposition the Government backtracked somewhat on its program. The goal of 500,000 men under arms was trimmed, and the conscription period was shortened from 18 months to 12. The first young conscripts finally reported for duty in 1956.

From these humble beginnings the West German armed forces have made substantial progress. Thus by April, 1959, more than half of the projected total of 350,000–380,000 men were under arms. The new *Bundeswehr* numbered 114,000, and it was adding manpower at the rate of 10,000 every three months. It is pointing toward a maximum peacetime strength of 200,000 by March 31, 1961.¹ The revived Air Force numbered 40,500 men, with just under 300 pilots. Its ultimate goal is 100,000 men, of whom 2,000 will be flying officers.² The Navy has a planned maximum strength of 27,000–30,000,³ and has now achieved about three-fourths of that maximum.⁴

¹ *The New York Times*, March 28, 1959.

² *Ibid.*

³ "The New German Army—Its Strength. . . Its Future Job." *U.S. News and World Report*, April 27, 1959, p. 46.

⁴ *The New York Times*, *op. cit.*

⁵ *Christian Science Monitor*, July 8, 1959, p. 14 (editorials).

⁶ *The New York Times*, *op. cit.*

The new *Bundeswehr* still depends primarily on the United States for its equipment, but West Germany is now producing light weapons and munitions, and soon will be turning out mines, hand grenades, explosives and anti-tank rockets. Unarmored military vehicles are being manufactured, a situation which will be changed when the production of medium tanks is instituted, probably this year. But the German government disclaims any intention of setting up a self-sufficient arms industry, and is a member of an arms pool arrangement with Italy and France. These three plus the Netherlands and Belgium are going to produce jointly the American low altitude anti-aircraft rocket Hawk, and it is expected that other missile systems and the so-called "European" tank will be turned out in the same manner.

A roughly similar state of affairs prevails in equipping the new Air Force. Of its goal of 1,000 jet aircraft, it now has 350, virtually all of American manufacture,⁵ and most becoming obsolescent. Only about 100 are operational combat aircraft.⁶ The Germans themselves have been producing only courier planes and medium transports, both under license, and jet trainers. But they have adopted the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter as the backbone of the Air Force and have contracted to produce it in Germany. In addition 250 of these planes will be procured from America. Furthermore, West German plants are beginning to turn out the Fiat G-91 under license. This is a plane with an Italian airframe and a British Bristol engine. This craft was selected for so-called lightweight tactical strikes, and most probably will be used for ground support.

The decision of West Germany to manufacture the F-104 raises a problem similar to that of the munitions industry, namely how far to go. The decision was taken because of maintenance and supply problems arising from the fact that the Lockheed Company is situated in California, 6,000 miles away. But it nevertheless means that Germany will be taking a giant stride toward resuming an important place as an aircraft producer, a development her neighbors and allies accept realistically, but again, not enthusiastically.

The West German Navy, like its sister

services, is primarily equipped from abroad. Of its approximately 125 vessels, at least 84 represent craft returned to the Germans since 1950.⁷ Seven frigates have been purchased from Britain, and a destroyer, the *Anthony*, rechristened *Zerstörer I*, has been leased from us. Only 12 ships of this navy are new, and the rest are aging fast. As a result Germany has projected a naval program calling for the construction of 153 vessels, including 12 destroyers and 12 350-ton submarines,⁸ but the program has scarcely gotten underway. This German construction effort will be geared to producing a modern small vessel navy of about 200 ships, capable of carrying out the defensive and interdiction tasks assigned to West Germany by Nato. At present there is little indication of further expansion of the West German naval potential.

The burgeoning state of the German military and munitions establishments should not blind us to their obvious shortcomings. No single arm of this military establishment is as yet an effective fighting force. Thus the army has seven "combat ready" divisions, but it is estimated that these understrength units could not sustain combat for more than five days. A tenth and eleventh division were created last year by taking cadres out of relatively well trained divisions. Those divisions thus suffered a loss both in manpower and state of training. A twelfth division is to be formed this year, presumably in the same manner, and further reorganization into three self-contained brigades is going forward.

To the natural confusion adduced by these problems of organization can be added definite shortcomings in the officer corps. Some of the general officers are considered to have definite weaknesses, and a whole generation of junior officers and young non-commissioned officers must be trained.⁹ In the light of these conditions it will take some time, probably three to four years, before the *Bundeswehr* is shaken down into a really effective component of Nato.

The same situation obtains, of course, with respect to the Air Force. It has been pointed out above that up-to-date combat aircraft are very skimpy in numbers, and that training of young pilots is proceeding rather slowly. The Air Force now consists of four partly trained

squadrons of F-84-F's, plus some transport units, and like the *Bundeswehr*, it is presently capable of only a token effort. It hopes to attain a goal of 24 squadrons in 1960, but of these only 10 would be operational. That latter figure represents a reduction of over 80 per cent from the original goal of 44 squadrons in 1960.¹⁰ Or, if we look at the data in terms of wings, we find that the Air Force hoped to have 12 wings activated by the end of 1959, consisting of five fighter-bomber wings, three air defense wings, two reconnaissance and two transport wings.¹¹ It is too early to say whether this goal has actually been achieved, but it would not be surprising, in any event, if a number of these units were little more than skeleton organizations. It will probably be 1963 or 1964 before the German Air Force is fully manned and trained, possesses the planned 1,000 jets, and a full network of 20 or more air bases.

The Navy's shortages in material have already been pointed up. In addition it suffers the characteristic personnel difficulties of the new German armed services, rust among the senior officers, and an utter lack of experience among the men. But once these shortcomings are acknowledged, the fact remains that the Germans are building well. Furthermore, they have the paradoxical advantage of a late start. This enables them to take advantage of the newest technological developments, without having had to put much in the way of resources or manpower into such development themselves. If there are personnel weaknesses, there is also a huge pool of veterans, who have been drawn on to fill out the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks.

Nor are the West Germans making any small plans. Naturally they cannot rebuild the awesome military machine of Hitler Germany, although the ability to use nuclear weapons renders any army awesome. Furthermore any such attempt would mean the absolute destruction of the entire postwar international system. The German govern-

⁷ *Army Navy Air Force Register and Defense Times*, April 5, 1958, p. 12.

⁸ *The New York Times*, *op. cit.*

⁹ *Army Navy Air Force Register and Defense Times*, April 25, 1959, p. 24.

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, *op. cit.*

¹¹ *Army Navy Air Force Register and Defense Times*, April 25, 1959, *op. cit.*

ment protests that any such development is unthinkable. As Defense Minister Josef Strauss has put it in awkward but forceful English:

Political and economic developments exclude that Germany will ever again be a military power. The German territory and German economy have a different aspect from what they were 30 years ago. This development is not arguable.¹²

But within the limits set down by Nato, which had repeatedly approved their military reorganization and build up, the Germans may have the preponderant military force among the Western European powers within a few years.

This becomes apparent when comparisons are made with the military forces of the other European members of Nato. The British have been cutting their forces and relying more heavily on the nuclear deterrent since 1957. Thus it is estimated that by April of this year the British armed forces, exclusive of women in the service, will total 515,400.¹³ This is broken down into 260,400 for the Army, 160,200 for the RAF, and 94,800 for the Royal Navy.¹⁴ Furthermore, Britain's defense program envisages the continued contraction of her forces to about 400,000. National Service, as the British call conscription, will come to an end. Considering Britain's overseas commitments, shrunken but still far flung, it is easy to imagine that in a few years German troops on the Nato line will exceed those of England.

However, it seems likely that British air power, in the conventional sense, will continue to occupy a role secondary only to that of the United States, insofar as Nato is concerned. For Britain is possessed of a strategic bomber force, now being equipped with the new *Vulcan* and *Victor* aircraft, planes whose performance in speed and altitude, according to an official government statement, is "unsurpassed by any bomber aircraft in service in any other country." By way of contrast, the nascent German Air Force will not be equipped with strategic bombers, which indeed, are forbidden to it. However the versatile F-104, which can act as a fighter, fighter-bomber, or reconnaissance plane, can carry a nuclear payload, as can the obsolescing F-84-F. Thus West Germany has the means to deliver tactical nuclear warheads,

but the control of these warheads remains in American hands. Also, those German units which will be capable of carrying nuclear devices are to be assigned to Nato, and the decision as to the use of nuclear weapons remains, in the first instance, with the Nato Commander in Chief.¹⁵ In short, it is probably safe to state that while the German Air Force may not be the dominant European air arm, its very existence should add to German influence in Nato.

At any rate there is evidence that the French Air Force feels this way, and is not happy about it, despite official French policy of the moment of *rapprochement* with Germany. This may well be a reflection of dissatisfaction with French defense policy, which calls for a jet air force to remain at a 750 plane level,¹⁶ while the Germans plan to build their force up to 1,000 jets. However this disparity may not prove too important if France successfully explodes her own nuclear bomb. When and if this event takes place France will possess the leverage which President Charles de Gaulle's government believes necessary to raise France to a position of equality with Britain and the United States in the councils of Nato.

France is going ahead with plans to create an atomic striking force as part of this same policy. Contracts have been let for the building of planes, French planes, which will be able to carry nuclear weapons. The French are not deterred by the fact that not only must they explode a bomb of their own, but they must also solve the problem of reducing its size and weight to the point where it can be carried in a plane. They apparently think they will solve this problem themselves, or that the United States will provide the necessary information. Certainly France's possession of its own nuclear stocks and the means to carry them could not help but enhance its bargaining power. But France will have to be very careful in employing the bomb as a diplomatic makeweight. In fact, should she brandish it in too heavy-handed a fashion, the result may well be even greater Nato reliance on Germany.

Furthermore, Germany's influence in Euro-

¹² *The New York Times*, March 29, 1959, p. 30.

¹³ Defense Statistics 1959/60, Cmnd. 661, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *U.S. News and World Report*, April 27, 1959, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ *Aviation Week*, June 29, 1959, p. 26.

pean and Nato affairs is also likely to continue to rise as long as the Algerian rebellion remains unsettled. What with the Indochina war, and the Algerian conflict following hard on its heels, France has never really assumed the land defense burden in Nato that was originally intended. Over 400,000 French troops continue to be tied up in Algeria, while manpower cuts since 1957 have forced France to withdraw two divisions from her 80,000 man Nato complement for service there. Simple logic points to a rise in West German influence in Nato *vis à vis* France as the new West German forces increase in size and power.

Nor will Britain, France or the other European members of Nato necessarily profit in influence from a nuclear missile capability for as we have seen West Germany will possess this capability too. Of course it will not be an independent capability of the type to which France aspires, and which Britain already possesses, but for Nato purposes it would not be appreciably different.

Restrictions on German Arms

The nature of the German nuclear missile capability is illustrative of the crosscurrents of feeling within Nato as they affect Germany. Thus under the London and Paris Agreements of 1954 Germany undertook not to manufacture atomic, chemical or biological weapons, long distance guided missiles, magnetic or influence mines, large warships, and strategic bombers. That prohibition still applies, and probably will continue to do so as long as the international picture does not change appreciably.

However, by 1957 Chancellor Adenauer was calling for tactical atomic weapons for West Germany in view of similar developments in the defense forces of other countries. By early 1958 the creation of a nuclear armed German force was labeled by General Norstad, the Supreme Commander, as indispensable to Nato. Perhaps both of these statements reflected predominantly American views, rather than those strictly of Germany or the other Nato powers. At any rate, after his return from a visit to the United States in March of 1958, Defense Minister Strauss indicated that Germany would accept an American offer of *Matador* pilotless bombers with conventional warheads, but with appropriate nuclear warheads to be stored in Ger-

many, subject to American control. This was in line with a policy enunciated by the late Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, the preceding December. In April, 1958, the West German *Bundestag* approved a resolution authorizing the government to accept such dual purpose (conventional or nuclear) weapons, and the program has since gone forward.

As has become customary, France and Italy accept this development as good Nato members, if without any notable enthusiasm. The British government has backed the move, although British public opinion seems to be no more than lukewarm to the whole idea. However German refusal to accept American I.R.B.M. bases on their territory may allay some of the popular suspicion of German military resurgence.

As a matter of fact, the West German nuclear capability, in keeping with the nature of the mission assigned to West German forces, will consist of weapons generally deemed defensive in character. Thus 24 *Matador* missiles, a surface to surface weapon, have been purchased for training purposes. In addition, the German Air Force will use the *Nike* anti-aircraft missile. Two-thirds of these weapons will have high explosive warheads, while the final third will be adapted for nuclear warheads. It is hoped that the organization of *Nike* units will be completed in 1960. In addition, the *Hawk*, another American missile, will be used by German forces. West Germany, as a member of the Nato arms pool, is now producing this weapon, whose dimensions exceed those to which German missile construction was originally limited.¹⁷ The Germans are also buying the *Corporal*, *Sergeant* and *Honest John* rockets, all short-range tactical missiles, with the last named essentially an artillery rocket. Finally, the United States has signed an agreement with West Germany for co-operation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. Under this agreement certain classified information relative to the military applications of atomic energy may be made available to Germany, and non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving restricted data may likewise be transferred. In contrast, an agreement with

¹⁷ *Christian Science Monitor* (editorial), July 8, 1959, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

France provides for the sale by the United States of nuclear fuel for use in a nuclear propulsion plant of a land-based prototype of a submarine. But no communication of restricted data is involved.

The military buildup of West Germany has consequences, of course, which go beyond the internal relationships of Nato. Principally these consequences concern relations with East Germany and the nations of the Soviet bloc. Specifically, will the rearmament of West Germany spoil chances for German reunification, and will it bind the satellite countries more closely to the Soviet Union?

In answering the first of these it should be borne in mind that the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) maintains a not inconsequential military force itself, a force which antedates that of the Bonn government. There are 110,000 men in the seven division *Volksarmee*, which supposedly has the officers necessary to double its present size.¹⁸

In addition there is an 11,000 man Air Force equipped with obsolete Migs, and a 10,000 man Navy which operates light units in the Baltic. To supplement these forces there are Border Police, a force of 40,000 men with tanks and anti-tank guns, the Alert Police, Railway Police, and paramilitary units. Possibly significantly, the Soviet Union has not equipped these forces with nuclear weapons yet.

Presumably the function of these forces would be to defend the East German regime against aggression, a desire for which is continually ascribed to West Germany in Communist propaganda. Yet it is more likely that they serve other purposes such as internal policing. After all, the Soviet Union still keeps 400,000 men on East German soil, which would seem sufficient to protect against any West German thrust. Of course no such thrust is likely unless the Western alliance system breaks down completely, and probably not even then. Inasmuch as any attempt at reunification by force seems barred, since it would probably mean the onset of World War III, and indeed since peaceful reunification seems to be excluded by Soviet policy, it is doubtful whether the military restoration of West Germany will appreciably affect this issue.

There is no doubt that such rearmament adds to the uneasiness of Poland and other Eastern European states. Polish fears of West German aggression are probably genuine, and are not confined to Communist propagandists. When Chancellor Adenauer made a speech on the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II in which he admitted German responsibility for the destruction wrought in Poland, and called for a new approach in Polish-West German relations, he was rebuffed by Premier Cyrankiewicz. Some observers have noted that American policy in the Eastern European countries cannot exploit its opportunities because it is so closely identified with the reconstruction of Germany. For those countries our support of German rearmament is likely to confirm their fears, and, in answer to our earlier question, solidify their ties with Russia. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it seems unlikely to this writer that its policies have been very much affected by West German rearmament, whatever protestations may have been made to the contrary.

From what has been said above it is apparent that there is still fear, articulate and inarticulate, among West Germany's allies as well as her enemies, that the revival of German armed strength may yet be regretted. Certainly militarism is a sentiment that must be kept under control, and the German government has made strong efforts to that end, to see that a democratic spirit pervades the army, and that certain excesses of discipline characteristic of the *Wehrmacht* and its predecessors are abolished. Furthermore, Germany's military mission is limited and directed by Nato. Of course there are occasional disquieting signs, and the existence of large numbers of refugees from Germany's former territories now under Polish or Czech sovereignty, many of whom want to return, is a cause for some anxiety. Thus it is probably fair to say that the manner in which West Germany deals with renascent militarism will be the acid test of German good faith and Bonn's attempts at democracy. West Germany's allies hope this problem never arises, but if it does, they are confident that the German people and government will meet the test.

¹⁸ John Rich, "The Reluctant Warriors," *The Reporter*, June 11, 1959, p. 23.

"Notwithstanding the increasing evidence in contemporary Germany of a trend toward a two-party or two-plus party system, the roots of German political development lie deep in the past." As this specialist sees it, "Unlike American political parties, German parties are steeped in ideologies, past traditions and differences of class, religion and geography."

The Current German Political Scene

By JOHN KELLER

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THE TRAGEDY of Germany and Central Europe today is that there was for Germany no 1776, no 1789, no spirit comparable to what the French mean by "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité." German history is complex and frightfully difficult for many students because of the lack of any unifying force, until the late nineteenth century. By 1789, France, Spain, Austria and Russia were compact national states. Germany, in contrast, included over 300 independent, sovereign states, principalities and free imperial cities.

The Protestant Reformation and religious

war that followed failed to unite Germany. Although most Germans withdrew in horror from the terrible French Revolution, the chief result of Napoleon's imperium was to reduce the number of independent German states from 314 to 38. The story of Germany's struggle for unification forms a vital part of any analysis, however brief, of the development of the German outlook on society and of Germany's emergence into the realm of world politics. In their efforts to achieve national unity, most German liberals gave a priority to nationalism *vis à vis* the general principles of liberalism. However, national unity was finally achieved not by liberals, but by Prussians who gloried in the use of military might (*Machtpolitik*).

Twice within the twentieth century the Western Powers have been drawn into a Herculean conflict with a united Germany bent on European hegemony or *Weltpolitik*. The implications of German military and economic power are already beginning to trouble many European statesmen. Whether or not a nuclear armed Reich may repeat past history, it seems certain that a resurgent Germany will again hold the key to European peace and security.¹

The United States, because of her power-

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¹ James P. Warburg, *Germany: Key to Peace* (Harvard Un. Press, 1953), pp. 1-7. Arguing that the world crisis following World War II began in Europe, this writer contends that "our misunderstanding and mishandling of the postwar crisis in Europe . . . were largely responsible . . . for failures to act in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America."

ful position in world affairs since World War II, finds herself concerned with the contemporary German problem. In general, Americans, many of whom have only recently become cognizant of its complexities, find numerous aspects of German history and political development unintelligible. This is particularly true when these complexities are expressed in the various and often conflicting pronouncements of propagandists for the East and West Germans, the administration and opposition parties in West Germany, the Free Democrats and Social Democrats, the German party and Refugee Bloc, the internationalists, the neutralists and nationalists and the now outlawed Neo-Nazis and West German Communists.

The multi-party system, with its major and minor parties, splits and realignments, has also proved confusing to Americans. Notwithstanding the increasing evidence in contemporary Germany of a trend toward a two-party or two-plus party system, the roots of German political development lie deep in the past. Unlike American political parties, German parties are steeped in ideologies, past traditions and differences of class, religion and geography.

German Parties after World War II

The basic aims of the Potsdam program were: 1) disarmament and demilitarization to prevent German revival and reorganization; 2) denazification to destroy the National Socialist party and dissolve all Nazi institutions; 3) decentralization of Germany's political structure along with the development of local responsibility; and 4) democratization of German political life on the basis of peaceful cooperation in international life.

After the defeat of the Nazi regime there was no German state. A unique situation developed in which political parties were "founded, built up and approved by the Military Governments, not only in the absence of the state . . . but precisely for the purpose of organizing such a state, or at least aiding in its formation."² Yet the very object of a political party, according to Max

Weber, was to control the state within which it existed.³ Nevertheless, all four occupation powers proceeded to solve the problem of government by permitting four major political parties and even promoting their organization.

This unprecedented development resulted from the exclusive and tyrannic domination of the German state by the Nazi party, which eventually destroyed both German democracy and the German state in the holocaust of World War II. The supreme sacrifices made by Germans in concentration camps and in the underground against dictatorship are of profound significance for the political future of the German nation.

The Western Powers laid careful plans to reestablish German parties gradually on a local basis from the grass roots. Thus politically mature Germans had ample opportunity to prevent the growth of extremist parties of a neo-fascist or Communist nature. However, the Soviet armies had no military government apparatus comparable to that of the Western Powers. Depending on native German officials, they proceeded to capitalize on their lack of preparation and at the same time to gain the good will of Germans at the expense of the West.

Almost immediately after the cessation of hostilities, the Soviets imported exiled German Communists from Moscow, and licensed four parties in the Eastern Zone: the Communist party, the Social Democrats and then also two middle class parties, the Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.) and the Liberal Democratic party (L.D.P.). This was a shrewd move; Germans vividly recalled the deterioration of the Weimar regime because of the confusion of too many parties. The idea of four major parties seemed also to guarantee against the tyranny of the one-party Nazi state.

Now the Western Powers were under strong pressure to follow Russia's lead. They too licensed four parties, including the Communists on the extreme Left, the Social Democrats Left of Center, the Christian Democrats in the Center and the Liberals, moderately Rightist.

New Forces in West Germany

In rejecting Nazism in the period after World War II, the West German electorate

² Dolf Sternberger, "Parties and Party Systems in Postwar Germany," in *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Nov., 1948, Vol. 260, p. 10).

³ See Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 167ff.

turned politically Left of Center. The miserable economic conditions of the years 1946 to 1948 induced even middle-class groups to favor various schemes for the nationalization of industry. All the *Land* (state) diets in Germany reflected the political mood of the times. Moderate and conservative elements opposed to this trend were politically and economically impotent prior to the currency reform of June, 1948. Social Democrats wanted the Minister-Presidents of the *Länder* replaced as spokesmen for the German people and as negotiators with the Allies, because they preferred a more efficient, a more centralized and a more German-minded leadership. The right wings of the Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.) and Free Democratic Party (F.D.P.) also wanted this change, but for different reasons.

The formation of the West German Federal Republic at Bonn in September, 1949, introduced new forces in German politics and placed political influence in new hands. It shifted West Germany's center of political gravity to the Rhine-Ruhr area. Even more significant, it created a new set of policymakers and drew into the political arena groups which had heretofore been dormant. The currency reform and resulting economic improvements revived property interests. Relaxation of Military Government political controls encouraged passive and active supporters of Hitler's Reich to re-enter politics. Former Nazis and militarists now came forth with views hitherto prohibited under Military Government restrictions. They argued that Hitler's Germany had opposed the Bolshevization of the world and that the Allied victory over Germany had weakened the Western position. Founding the *Deutsche Reichspartei* and other associations such as the *Brüderschaft*, they contended that Germany's role should be that of a "third force" to maneuver between East and West.⁴ Thus by 1949 most Germans were aware that Germany was no longer a mere pawn in the hands of the occupation powers. Both these groups and the private property interests, revived by the currency reform, were hostile to the *Land* administrations as then constituted. Since the C.D.U. won the Bundestag elections of 1949, its Right-wing reaped the benefits of the change. Leaders

of Dr. Adenauer's coalition cabinet were against all cooperation with the Social Democratic party (S.P.D.), which was now excluded from all participation in the formulation of foreign policy. Although Social Democrats had been outstanding in the work of reconstruction after the Nazi holocaust in 1945, they were now relegated to the role of a national opposition party.

C.D.U.—Composition, Leaders and Tactics

The Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.) was founded in 1945 and quickly developed into a genuine "people's party" on a very broad basis. For the first time in German history a party attracted strong Catholic and Protestant elements, without being clerical.⁵ One significant result of the establishment of the Bonn Government was to accelerate the organization of the C.D.U., heretofore unable to agree on a uniform platform for either domestic or foreign affairs.

The C.D.U.-C.S.U. is essentially a coalition of non-Socialist politicians of various backgrounds: former Center leaders, representatives of the Protestant religious camp, old Liberals of various leanings—more to the Left than the Right, farmers and urban middle class and trade union elements. In domestic politics, the party represents a double compromise between Catholics and Protestants and between economic conservatism and trade union interests of co-determination and social welfare.

Since 1949, the C.D.U.-C.S.U. has been the mainstay of the Federal Government and is represented in the governments of seven of the ten *Länder*. In five *Länder* the Minister-President belongs to the C.D.U.: namely Schleswig-Holstein, the Saar, Hamburg and Baden-Württemberg. The Rhineland is represented by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and other high officials. "While South Germany retains formal political leadership, the Rhineland holds the administrative and bureaucratic controls."⁶ Men from the Rhineland and South Germany occupy most key

⁴ Samuel L. Wahrhaftig, "The Development of German Foreign Policy Institutions," Chapter 2 in Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davidson, editors, *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy* (White Plains, N.Y., Row, Peterson and Co., 1957), pp. 21-24.

⁵ See Kassel Declaration of the Evangelical Labor Circle of C.D.U./C.S.U. (22 June, 1957). C.S.U. stands for Christian Social Union, the Bavarian counterpart of the C.D.U.

⁶ Samuel L. Wahrhaftig, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

cabinet positions in the West German Government: Foreign Affairs, Economics, Finance and Defense. Baden-Württemberg deputies dominate the leadership in the Bundestag, holding important assignments on committees, particularly the Foreign Affairs Committee. By contrast North Germans participate relatively little in parliamentary or cabinet affairs.

Although the C.D.U. now derives more support from conservative forces and former Nazis than from trade unions, it is democratically elected and criticized constantly by the S.P.D. opposition, at times by the Free Democrats and even by members of its own coalition. At the Party Congress of the C.D.U. (April 27-29, 1956) Professor Ferdinand Ehrensberg (C.D.U. deputy) criticized Adenauer's foreign policy and called for more friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, Kurt Kiesinger, and the Bundestag President, Eugen Gerstenmaier (both C.D.U. deputies) have been continually pressing for a larger role in the formulation of West German foreign policy, but to no avail. In the main, the Chancellor has merely used them to advance policies already enunciated, insisting that in the first formative years of the Federal Republic, he must have full control of foreign policy.

For a time Heinrich von Brentano had the confidence of the press, the Foreign Affairs Committee and of the S.P.D. opposition with his frankness and conciliation toward the opposition. These characteristics were noted, however, when the Chancellor was either sick or on vacation. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brentano moved cautiously to avoid antagonizing the Chancellor and to improve the harmony and integration of the Foreign Office, with its 5,000 officials. No doubt professional diplomats were glad to see a career diplomat supervising the Foreign Office in the Cabinet and in the Government.

It is difficult to define the ideologies, groups and personalities which influence the Chancellor, who keeps his own counsel. His role in policy determination is explained partly by his mastery of party politics and partly by his personality, at first artificially built up abroad and later by domestic public relations. Most important is his dual role

as head of the state and head of the strongest party, the C.D.U. This means control over personnel in the various ministries, the chiefs of which are in the C.D.U., are Catholic, and come from the Ruhr. For the past ten years German public opinion has been trained to have confidence in the Chancellor, assuming that *der Alte* can do no wrong. Moreover, natives of the West German *Länder* are in full control of various government branches as well as the institutions which help frame public opinion.

Historic circumstances have largely determined the significant role of the Chancellor, who has not been plagued by the large Communist minorities nor by the extreme Right-wing nationalists, militarists and armed groups, who eventually ruined the Weimar Republic. Social Democratic opponents of his foreign policy are staunch supporters of German democratic institutions. Even their opposition to rearmament increased his bargaining power with the West. Another powerful factor contributing to the success of Adenauer's foreign policy has been East-West cold war tensions, dominated by the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over the future of Germany. In the future German foreign policy may not be so dependent upon the United States.

S.P.D.—Composition, Leaders and Principles

The Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.) is the oldest of the existing German parties and the strongest opponent of the C.D.U., although it also played an important role in founding the Federal Republic and in drafting its constitution. The S.P.D., too, had to be refounded in 1945 after 12 years of Nazi rule. Although a minority party, it has a powerful political machine, with some 600,000 dues-paying members, as compared with 250,000 in the C.D.U. Composed of white collar workers, manual laborers, civil servants, pensioners and some intellectuals, it has far less sociological range than the C.D.U. The S.P.D. is represented in six of the ten West German *Länder* (states), in four of them the Minister-President is a Social Democrat, namely, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, Bavaria and Bremen. In the West Berlin municipal elections of 1958, Mayor Brandt's Social Democratic Party won an

absolute majority of seats in the lower house, despite Adenauer's urgent appeals for a C.D.U. majority.

As to campaign methods, the S.P.D. makes full use of films, slides, tape recordings and sound trucks as well as the spoken word. Stressing the importance of a well-considered platform, clarifying issues, as against mudslinging and wild political insinuations, the S.P.D. Press and Publicity Chief, Fritz Heine, stated that "we have been fighting Communists in the Federal Republic for over ten years as well as Communists in East Germany. As a result, at the last Federal elections (1957) only 2.2 per cent of the voters still voted Communist." The dynamic, eloquent leader of the S.P.D. from 1945 to 1952 was Dr. Kurt Schumacher, who became a national figure, admired by his opponents for his intelligence and feared by his friends for his refusal to compromise.

Erich Ollenhauer succeeded Schumacher, who died in 1952, but Ollenhauer lacks his colorful personality and dynamic leadership, although he is more conciliatory. During the Hitler regime, he migrated to Prague, to Paris and finally to London, where he came under the influence of Clement Attlee and the British Labor Party. In the Bundestag debates, Ollenhauer often refers to his party as the loyal opposition.

Young Social Democrats in Berlin criticize the bureaucratic dogmatism of the party functionaries (paid secretaries) who constitute a ruling hierarchy in this highly centralized party. They wish Ollenhauer would continue as chairman of the party secretariat, but prefer Professor Carlo Schmid (Bundestag Vice President) as chairman of the parliamentary fraction and Wilhelm Kaisen of Bremen or Willy Brandt of Berlin as chairman of the annual party congresses, which represent the party rank and file. However, Ollenhauer has the solid backing of the S.P.D. majority.

Inspired by C.D.U. defeats in Bavaria in 1954 and in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1956, the S.P.D. chairman prepared a trenchant critique of West German foreign policy for the Bulletin of the Asian Socialist Conference. His thesis was that the central issue of world disarmament linked together the interests of European Socialists, all desiring controlled

disarmament. In the foreign policy debates in the Bundestag in June, 1956, the S.P.D. leadership called for a reorientation of foreign policy by the Adenauer Government, demanding: four power negotiations for a European Security System; normal diplomatic and trade relations with Russia, China and the nations of Eastern Europe; and maximum relations between the populations of the Soviet Zone and West Germany.

This action by the Bundestag fraction of the S.P.D. was approved at the biennial Party Congress in Munich, July 4-14, 1956. Contending that the West German Federal Republic should be free from thinking in terms of bloc policy, a psychosis induced by the Adenauer Government, the Party Congress called for constructive cooperation among all political groups sincerely interested in international understanding, the rights of democracy and social justice. Recognizing the growing importance of Asia as a factor in international politics, the S.P.D. Congress reaffirmed its unqualified adherence to the right of self-determination.

In 1956 German public opinion polls ran in favor of the S.P.D. by 46 per cent as against 36 per cent for the C.D.U. The Hungarian uprising and the Suez Crisis in October, 1956, enabled the Social Democrats to argue that military strength in these two cases had failed to preserve peace and stability as claimed. However, the German press as a whole took no account of this switch in public opinion from the C.D.U. Consequently, there was no band wagon effect to aid the S.P.D. The ruthless suppression of the Hungarian revolt by Russian tanks and the Anglo-French retreat from Suez enabled Adenauer to claim that Germany was the number three World Power. Thereafter, public opinion polls showed a switch back to Adenauer, with the C.D.U. again polling 46 per cent and the S.P.D., 36 per cent. The turn of the year 1956 witnessed the turn of the tide, according to the *Institut für Demoskopie*.

For a number of years the Social Democrats have been proposing a collective security system for Europe. The idea made its way gradually until now it can be found in various forms in Soviet and Western proposals.

⁷ *News from Germany* (April, 1957), Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 3-4.

Among these various forms could be listed the Rapacki Plan, presented by the Polish Foreign Minister, Free Democratic proposals made in the Bundestag; and the Kennan Plan, presented over the British Broadcasting System in 1957. However, political parties in West Germany are allowed a small margin of choice, with major decisions of foreign policy still the prerogative of the Western Powers. In contrast, the Weimar Republic was able to determine economic policies, the system of government through the national constituent assembly, elected in 1919, and questions of foreign policy. "The as yet undigested past, the partial loss of political autonomy and the precariousness of the present European balance of power foster reserve and non-committal attitudes."⁸

F.D.P.—Composition, Leaders, Strategy

Founded in 1945 to attract both liberal and conservative forces, the Free Democratic Party (F.D.P.) has always been the third largest party, although the tide of world public opinion went against it after World War II.⁹ The F.D.P. is the heir of the old German liberal parties: National Liberals, Progressives, Weimar Democrats and the People's Party of Stresemann. Standing for religious, political and economic freedom, it is also the heir of many splits and divisions among liberals. Free Democrats derive more sociological support from Protestant urban middle classes: professions, trades, small and medium-sized industries. They have no influence with manual workers and rural voters.

The strategy of the F.D.P. makes it stronger than its small percentage of votes would seem to indicate. It is a coalition partner in most *Land* governments: with the C.D.U. in Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate; with the S.P.D. in Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia. A center party, it may align with either the Right or Left. From 1949 to 1953, the F.D.P. held the balance of power between the Government and the S.P.D. opposition; from 1949 it was a member of the Adenauer Government coalition. Because of the scathing attacks of the S.P.D. on his foreign policy, Dr. Adenauer made concessions to the F.D.P., aiding its moderate and extreme

Right-wing in the *Länder* of Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia to pursue a policy of economic conservatism and strong nationalism. Critics of the Right-wing extremists noted their efforts to attract ex-Nazis to expand the F.D.P. after the Neo-Nazi Socialist Reichs Party (S.R.P.) was outlawed in 1952. It was hoped that the F.D.P. would be unified by Dr. Thomas Dehler, Party Chairman and Minister of Justice in the Adenauer Cabinet from 1953 to 1956. Dehler combined legal acumen with vigorous intellectual and oratorical talents, liberal traditions and strong traits of nationalism. However, he seemed to lack the maturity and mellowness of a seasoned politician and was later dropped from the cabinet.

In September, 1954, the solid front of the Adenauer coalition on foreign policy was weakened when Dehler dissociated his party from Adenauer's tactics after the defeat of the European Defense Community (E.D.C.) in the French National Assembly. In a radio interview Dehler implied that in criticizing Mendès-France, the Chancellor was trying to rally the Popular Republicans in France against the French Premier, whom Adenauer claimed was not backed by a majority of the French people. Dehler emphasized that Free Democrats did not condone aggressive political tactics against the French, that Communist votes were not decisive and that the defeat of the treaty was due to national opposition, for which all those involved were responsible, including Germans. The F.D.P. chairman ranged the whole field of foreign affairs and showed that he was in almost complete disagreement with Dr. Adenauer. Dehler even criticized the Chancellor for not having invited the opposition leader, Erich Ollenhauer, to participate in the Buehler-Hohe Conference on foreign policy.¹⁰

In February, 1956, the Free Democratic Party took the major step of withdrawing from the Adenauer coalition and since then has played an independent role, but in for-

⁸ Otto Kirchheimer, "The Political Scene in West Germany," in *World Politics: Quarterly Journal of International Relations* (April, 1957), Vol. IX, No. 3, pp. 433-444. See George Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited," in *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1959), Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 187 ff. for a penetrating analysis of the arguments for and against mutual withdrawal of troops by Russia and the Western Powers from an atomic free zone in central Europe.

⁹ In 1949, the F.D.P. polled about 12% of the votes, 10% in 1953 and 8% in 1957.

¹⁰ New York Times (7 September, 1954), Sec C, p. 9.

ign policy it has moved closer to the position taken by the Social Democratic Party. Fear of an unduly powerful C.D.U. is stronger in the Rhine-Ruhr, where conservative financial interests are aware of elements in the C.D.U. fraction that after Adenauer's death might align with the S.P.D. The conservative wing of the F.D.P. in the Rhine-Ruhr, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein is balanced by a Left-wing group of old-style German liberals, led by Reinhold Maier, which is strong in Hamburg and southwest Germany. "Even though Maier is now Chairman of the F.D.P., the official party position reflects the middle-of-the-road point of view."¹¹

The views of German business are reflected in those F.D.P. deputies who mistrust Adenauer's pro-Western orientation and consider themselves the guardians of German national interests. They insist that those interests should not be forfeited by sacrificing to the West and burning bridges to the East. During the great parliamentary debate on foreign policy in April, 1957, the F.D.P. chairman, Reinhold Maier, and his deputy and military expert, Dr. Mende, argued long and hard for mutual withdrawal of troops by the Allies from West Germany and by the Soviet Union from its Zone. A year later, in January, 1958, Dr. Mende berated the Adenauer Government for its failure to give serious consideration to any of the various plans for disengagement, as proposed by Anthony Eden, the Polish Foreign Minister, Rapacki, and by George Kennan. He then pointed to the offer of Soviet Minister President Bulganin in a note of December, 1957, to reduce Russian troops in Germany or withdraw them completely in proportion to withdrawals by the Nato Powers—France, Great Britain and the United States. "It is the right and duty of American policy and strategy to think first of America . . . of British and French policy and strategy to think first of their countries. It is our duty, Mr. Chancellor, to think first of the unification of Germany."¹²

F.D.P. strategy in the parliamentary elections of 1957 was to make no commitments in order to be in position to align with either the C.D.U. or S.P.D. later. Immediately after these elections, an F.D.P. deputy, Weyer, told Adenauer "We are with the

Social Democrats in the view that in Germany a three-party system is firmly established." Accusing the ruling majority of aiming to dominate foreign policy without consideration of the coalition parties, he also concluded that "We stand by our step in early 1956 in withdrawing from the Government Coalition."¹³

German Party—Composition, Leaders, Policies

The conservative German Party or Deutsche Partei (D.P.) has existed in Germany for over 80 years—founded in 1867 as a German-Hanoverian Party to protest Bismarck's *Machtpolitik* in his seizure of Schleswig-Holstein. Essentially a small federalist, states rights party, it polled only 4.5 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections of 1957 through the help of electoral alliances with the C.D.U. in Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein. Under the leadership of Heinrich Hollwege, its chairman and Minister-President of Lower Saxony, it expanded in northern Germany.

The German Party proved to be the most loyal of all coalition parties in the Adenauer Government, following the line of the C.D.U. on the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom and at the same time advocating strong ties with the Western Powers. In contrast to the C.D.U., however, the D.P. opposes parochial schools, is less interested in large-scale social problems of modern industrial life and is suspicious of the collectivism of the C.D.U. and its trade union wing. Standing to the right of the C.D.U., the German Party emphasizes support for agriculture and middle class traditions.

Like the F.D.P., the German Party welcomes ex-Nazis and even protested the denazification procedure of the Allied Military Government. It flies the old imperial colors (red, white and black) and favors using all three verses of "Deutschland Uber Alles" as acceptable for the national anthem. This party, though small, is worth following. It could merge with the C.D.U. or, if events justify it, could form a nucleus of a new Right-Wing party.

¹¹ Gabriel A. Almond, "The Politics of German Business," in Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy* (1957), p. 209.

¹² *Das Parlament* 8, 4 (29 January, 1958), p. 3.

¹³ "Wir sind mit des Sozialdemokraten der Auffassung, das sich in Deutschland und sie Duer ein Drieparteiensystem festigen wird." *Das Parlament* 8 Jahrgang, No. 34 (1957), pp. 5-7.

Should the German Federal Republic take full responsibility for West Berlin? This author believes that "The time at long last has come when the G.F.R. should assume responsibility for what it justly claims to be its territory instead of taking shelter behind the broad back of Uncle Sam." As he sees it, it is also necessary that Americans "should be disabused of the propaganda slogan that German unification is vital to the American national interest."

Unity for Germany?

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THE REUNIFICATION of the two German state entities, the German Federal Republic (G.F.R.) allied with the West, and the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), a member of the Soviet Bloc, is justly considered the principal controversy between the East and the West. The readers of these columns are thoroughly familiar with the basic arguments on both sides.¹ This article endeavors to present the German dilemma without illusions and wishful thinking, divesting itself of the official American and German mythologies and stereotypes that have, in the author's opinion, too long obfuscated the American public.

The events and facts leading to the present split into two German states are too well-known to require more than the briefest recapitulations. In accordance with general plans agreed on long before between the Western Allies and the U.S.S.R., Germany, upon unconditional surrender, was divided into three zones of occupation assigned to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union respectively; subsequently a fourth zone, cut mainly from American-

occupied territory, was given to the French. In the Potsdam Agreement (August, 1945) the four zones were placed under the administration of the four military zonal commanders who in due course reconstructed them in line with their respective national policies. The Allied Control Council was envisaged as the temporary government of Germany as a whole, charged with the direction and supervision of certain all-German agencies to be established for strictly functional fields. The latter, however, were never activated, at first because of the deliberate obstruction of the French, subsequently also due to the divergent aims of the American-British and the Soviet occupation authorities. The four-power control was duplicated for the city of Berlin whose area was divided into four occupation sectors under a joint occupation authority, the *Kommandatura*. Owing to the lack of good will of all concerned the Allied Control Council broke up in 1948. The Soviet attempt to squeeze the Western powers out of Berlin by the blockade was frustrated by the American airlift, to be terminated by mutual agreement in May, 1949.

Realizing the impossibility of German unification by the procedure envisaged at Potsdam the Western powers proceeded, in rapid successive stages, to the administrative, economic and political unification of their three zones. The result was the formation of the G.F.R. under a constitution drafted by the

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¹ See, among others, Current History, March, 1955 (Perry Laukhoff); April, 1955 (Karl Loewenstein and Hans Kohn); April, 1956 (Hans Gatzke); April, 1956 (A. F. K. Organski); October, 1959 (Stephen D. Kertesz).

Germans under Allied guidance, the so-called Bonn Basic Law (1949). In the Paris treaties of 1953 the G.F.R. was restored to full sovereignty and admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) as a full-fledged member. Allied military forces remained on German soil by virtue of a treaty concluded, in 1953, with the G.F.R. After the outbreak of the Korean War Western Germany, on American insistence and without noticeable enthusiasm on either the German or the British-French side, had slowly begun to rearm.

The procedure adopted by the West in granting its ward independence as a sovereign state was followed step by step by the U.S.S.R. for the part of Germany under its control. The *Länder* of the Soviet zone were formed into the G.D.R. (1949) under a constitution heavily flavored by the Soviet pattern and completely dominated by the Communist party (S.E.D.). Soviet troops, by permission of the Eastern German puppet government, remained on the soil of the G.D.R. which subsequently was incorporated into the Warsaw pact, a treaty organization destined at first to counter the Nato alliance. Later, however, different from Nato, it developed into a close affiliation of the satellite states with the U.S.S.R. for the purposes of joint economic planning and common trade.

Once again the solution adopted, on a wider scale, for the G.F.R. and the G.D.R. respectively was duplicated also for the respective occupation sectors of Berlin. However, Western Berlin, though considered a Land of the G.F.R., under the Bonn Constitution, does not participate in the latter's government and is operated as a separate political entity under its own city government. The Eastern sector of Berlin, on the other hand, was formally incorporated into the territory and government of the G.D.R.

Economically, the development of the two German states differed widely. Western Germany staged what is commonly spoken of as the "economic miracle" which, among her neighbors, has earned the German people the ironical appellation of the *Wunderkinder* (miracle children). By June, 1959, industrial production had reached the record level of 240 (on the basis of 100 for 1936). The G.F.R. had become the first industrial power

on the continent, its foreign trade, for the first time in history, surpassing that of England. Contributory to this success were, among other factors, massive American assistance through the Marshall plan and since; the political stability achieved under the unbroken rule of the Adenauer government backed by a solid majority of the German people; the absence of military burdens permitting the Germans to concentrate their resources on foreign trade and internal recovery; and, last but not least, the German people themselves, the ability of their businessmen and the self-restraint of labor, foregoing wage increases in the interest of national reconstruction.

The G.D.R., on the other hand, at first suffered heavily because of the enforced withdrawal of capital equipment as Soviet reparations in kind; the difficulties of converting a broken-down economy from *laissez faire* to guided socialism; administrative mismanagement and over-bureaucratization on the part of inexperienced party officials. At least until 1957, living standards remained far below the level of those of the G.F.R. For the last several years, however, the economic gap between the two Germanys has noticeably narrowed. Food rationing has been abandoned and consumer goods are available in sufficient quantity and quality, primarily owing to the expansion of foreign trade with the East. From a low of 42 in 1945, by 1959 industrial output reached 250 (on the basis of 100 for 1936). If this accomplishment had occurred in any non-Communist country, the West would have hailed it as a major achievement. The G.D.R. has become economically the most important Soviet satellite and the sixth industrial power on the continent.

One would assume that a people who have achieved national unity late and against considerable political odds would not easily resign themselves to being forcibly split into two unequal and mutually hostile parts. The zonal boundaries were drawn by the Allies with the most arbitrary disregard of historical and ethnical facts. For example, Thuringia, dear to all Germans in the name of Luther, Bach and Goethe, was assigned to the Soviet zone. In addition, the Germans realize that the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line—among them Silesia, Eastern and Western

Prussia, Pomerania—in terms of the Potsdam Agreement to be administered provisionally by Poland, are lost for good. The Germans expelled from these lands, together with the Sudeten Germans forcibly ejected from Czechoslovakia, all told some 11 million people, were dumped mostly into the G.F.R. where their manpower aided recovery.

The most astounding fact, however, arising from Germany's split personality and very little observed abroad, is the complete obliteration, by a stroke of the pen of the Allied Control Council (February, 1946), of the former state of Prussia, the state primarily instrumental in the creation of German unity and nationhood. The proverbial Prussian virtues of hard work, drive, efficiency and reliability were as responsible for the rise of Germany to the rank of a great power as the proverbial Prussian vices of arrogance, tactlessness, selfishness and militarism were repugnant to most other Germans and the world at large.

Ever since the Western powers, under the impact of the Korean War, reversed their former policies of German demilitarization and insisted on remilitarization, various conferences—too numerous and repetitious to mention—have been held between the Western and the Soviet foreign ministers to find a mutually agreeable method of German reunification. In spite of a vague formula agreed on by the summit conference of the heads of state at the Geneva Conference (summer, 1955) expressing common interest in German unification, these efforts have remained utterly unavailing. It is a matter of record that German unification is farther away today than at any time since 1945. The reasons for this firmly entrenched stalemate lie in the mutually exclusive policy aims of the powers, and in the widely divergent approaches as to how unification eventually is to be consummated.

To state these in the briefest possible terms: The Western powers, and particularly the G.F.R. (which in this case has actually imposed its viewpoint on its Western allies) wish to accomplish unification by the traditional techniques of democratic constitutionalism, that is (1) establishment, by free and honest elections in which all democratically organized political parties in both states

participate, of a joint National Assembly; (2) the latter to proceed to invest an all-German government with provisional powers and to draft a common constitution; (3) the government, or a succeeding one emanating from identical democratic processes, to conclude the peace treaty [with all former enemies in East and West], to be ratified by an all-German parliament; (4) the united Germany, then, freely to decide whether to adhere to Nato, or to the Warsaw pact, or to remain neutral and outside any alliance.

This *modus procedendi*, rooted in American political ideologies and corresponding to the political expectations of the Adenauer regime, was rejected from the start by the Soviet Union as well as by the government of the G.D.R. and this for obvious reasons: Free election in Eastern Germany would result in an overwhelming non-Communist majority; even though perhaps over-optimistic, the estimates run up to 90 per cent in favor of the Western-style democratic system. It is also assumed that a united Germany if permitted a free choice would prefer membership in the Western alliance to neutrality, let alone to joining the Soviet bloc. All Socialist accomplishments in the G.D.R. would be wiped out. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. would lose its economically and organizationally most advanced ally. The loss of Eastern Germany, in turn, would jeopardize the entire Soviet power position in Eastern and Central Europe and force Poland and Czechoslovakia into the power orbit of a united Germany.

To consent to these foreseeable consequences of unification on Western terms would be suicidal folly for the Soviets, let alone for its puppet government in the G.D.R. and its beneficiaries. The Soviets, therefore, proposed, and continue to propose, an altogether different procedure: to establish a confederation between the two independent German states through joint policy making and executory organs. These would then conclude a peace treaty for all of Germany with the former allies. The outlines of this proposal have been in evidence for a number of years; but, by his note of November 27, 1958, requesting the withdrawal of the Allies from Western Berlin and offering Western Berlin the status of a "Free

City," Khrushchev evidently aimed at the solution of the Berlin impasse in his favor as he forced his unification proposal to the forefront. In protracted negotiations—if this word is applicable to the propagandistic presentation of mutually incompatible positions on both sides—conducted in the foreign ministers' conference during the spring and summer of 1959, these positions were concretized without inducing either side to make concessions to the other except on inconsequential marginal issues.

The net result of this stalemate is that unification on Western terms is wholly unobtainable. In view of this undeniable fact the Soviet proposal—regardless whether it is meant honestly or should be considered merely an element of delaying tactics—may deserve some investigation. In the first place, the government of the G.F.R.—and the Western powers have identified themselves with it on this score—categorically refuses to recognize the existence of the Eastern German state which is spoken of as the "so-called G.D.R."² or, more often, as the Soviet zone of occupation. The very existence of the G.D.R. is studiously and consistently ignored. Official relations between the two governments do not exist. Unavoidable technical contacts, amounting in specific cases to formal agreements, are conducted on a lower administrative level such as concern for communications, the recognition of legal and other documents and similar matters. Cultural relations which are not infrequent operate through non-official channels.

The Adenauer government's refusal to have any dealings with the Eastern regime rests, beyond ideological-political reasons, on constitutional grounds. The Bonn Basic Law explicitly had been drafted as a provisional charter until all German Länder were in a position to establish a constitution for all Germany (preamble and Article 146). Hence, the Bonn Government considers, and conducts itself as the sole representative *in parti infidelium*. Existence and actions of an Eastern German government are declared to be illegal arrogations. Considering the actual situation this attitude is,

of course, merely an exercise in legalistic semantics and wholly devoid of reality. To all practical intents and purposes the G.D.R. is a state with all attributes of such, a going concern and, for that matter, uncomfortably alive and kicking.

A collateral consequence of the non-recognition of the G.D.R. is the problem of diplomatic relations of the G.F.R. with the states of the Eastern bloc. With the exception of the U.S.S.R. with which, for mutual interest, diplomatic relations were restored in 1955, the G.F.R. refuses to maintain diplomatic relations with any one of them and also threatens to sever relations with any state that recognizes the G.D.R. In the case of Yugoslavia relations were actually broken off when the latter recognized Eastern Germany. The policy is even dignified, after its originator, with the exalted name of the "Hallstein doctrine." Of late the policy came under heavy fire inside Germany, particularly since it frustrates trade with the Eastern states (*Östhandel*) for whose increasingly important flow German business has to find devious and costly channels.

Diplomatic relations, however, are a two-way street. Poland, Czechoslovakia and other Eastern states still vividly remember the treatment they suffered from Nazi Germany and are not encouraged by recent developments in Bonn. Thus they are still utterly reluctant to renew relations. When Chancellor Adenauer, under heavy pressure at home,³ made what he believed to be a conciliatory gesture, it was rejected out of hand by the incensed Poles because, with a tactlessness uncommon even in German postwar diplomacy, he took the opportunity to try to drive a wedge between Poland and the Soviets.

As long as the Bonn government persists in its adamant refusal to have any dealings with the G.D.R. the Soviet proposal for confederation remains inexecutable. On closer examination, it reveals also intrinsic difficulties and inconsistencies. A confederation whose partners are ideologically and politically in diametrical opposition is unworkable. Only economically and politically affinitive state entities could agree on common policies. Dictatorships and democracies cannot co-exist within the confederal frame.

Another seemingly insoluble difficulty lies

² In October, 1959, a radio announcer who accidentally had forgotten to speak of the "so-called" GDR had publicly to apologize.

³ In a broadcast to the Polish people, September 1, 1959.

in the question: Should the joint organs, whatever their name and function, be composed of an equal number of representatives of both participating states? In the foreign ministers' conference of last summer the West, again taking its cue from the Adenauer government, would have insisted (if the scheme were at all acceptable) on the numerical superiority of the G.F.R., on the superficially plausible ground of its larger territory—95,700 square miles against 41,800—and its larger population—53.5 against 17.4 million—on a ratio of 25 to 10 representatives for the G.F.R. and G.D.R. respectively. To avoid being permanently outnumbered and outvoted the Russians and their Eastern German stooges claim equal representation for both states. This, in turn, would permanently stalemate and deadlock the joint organ, a tangible indication that the Soviets do not even seriously wish their own proposal to be accepted.

To elaborate this theme further: The socio-economic and political divergences between the two regimes are such that no common denominator for a joint policy could be found by confederal organs. To mention only two specific cases: (1) How could the economic system of Eastern Germany (where the private sector outside socialization has shrunk to a maximum 20 per cent) be reconciled with the unmitigated free enterprise system of the G.F.R.? (2) The Eastern regime has recognized the loss of the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line while the Adenauer government insists that the border is a mere provisorium to be determined in the coming peace treaty. Such fundamental divergences could easily be multiplied. In short, the Soviet-Eastern German scheme, if it is anything more than a mere tactical device to lead to the recognition of the G.D.R., is wholly unworkable and doomed from the outset.⁴

In the light of this realistic appraisal of the altogether irreconcilable positions of the East and the West, the approach to the problem of German unification may be sought along an entirely different avenue. This requires answers to two basic issues. First, what do the German people in both sectors think of

German unification? Second: Is German unification actually in the American national interest and to the advantage of the Western world?

In trying to appraise the attitudes of each of the two Germanys towards unification one has to distinguish not only between the two parts themselves, but even more so between the policies officially proclaimed by the respective governments and their peoples at large. In Western Germany no politician whatever his party can fail, on the penalty of committing political suicide, to proclaim unification as the primary and unalterable goal of German policies. Any traveller, however, who is able to speak with the people themselves, is struck by their complete indifference towards the issue. Clemenceau's famous word about the loss of Alsace-Lorraine seems to have been converted to its opposite: *Toujours en parler, jamais y penser*: Always speak of unification but do not seriously consider it.

The complex reasons may be summarized thus: In the wake of unprecedented prosperity the Germans like others have become politically apathetic. So engrossed are they in personal advancement and the enjoyment of creature comforts that their political impetus exhausts itself every four years in voting the father image of Adenauer with the Christian Democrats into the seat of power. The government may worry, they work and make money. Moreover, the South Germans and *Rhinelanders* know little about the Eastern zone and care even less, let alone about the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Even the refugees from the East by now have become so completely integrated that there is no desire to return to lands of which the new generation knows nothing. The unified Reich is a distant memory.

The classes ruling the G.F.R., the bureaucracy and big business, have no interest whatsoever in the Eastern zone. Satisfying the steadily rising domestic demands for consumer and luxury goods and making money in the lucrative export trade, businessmen dread the day of unification when they may be called on to direct their investment capital to the Eastern zone in order to raise its living standards to the level of the West and to reconvert a state-managed economy to the private enterprise system. For the time being, German business shows little inclination

⁴ For an excellent discussion of these and related problems see Theodor Eschenburg (one of Western Germany's most sensible political scientists), *Die Deutsche Frage. Die Verfassungsprobleme der Wiedervereinigung*, Munich 1959.

to assume the prolonged and incalculable burdens unification would impose upon them. Finally, there exists the still inarticulate but compelling assumption that a split Germany is a blessing in disguise. As constituted today, with a more homogenous population and with its technological industry and scientific agriculture well matched—the G.F.R. is a more compact, economically and ethnically much better integrated state than was the Reich before.

Potent political reasons if officially not admitted weigh also heavily against unification. For the past ten years the G.F.R. has been ruled by the Christian Democrats, a predominantly Catholic party despite the sophisticated denominational arithmetics by which the leading positions are divided between Catholics and Protestants. Contrariwise, Eastern Germany is an almost wholly Protestant land. Unification, therefore, would be to the disadvantage of the ruling Catholic party. Party politics follow the same lines. Berlin and Saxony have always been the citadels of the Social Democrats who, upon reunification, would certainly not vote Christian Democratic. Thus the Adenauer regime has not the slightest political interest in unification. For the very same reasons in reverse, the Social Democrats claim and proclaim unification because it is their only way to become a majority party with the chances of forming an alternative government.

Finally, a subconscious argument derived from German history should not be overlooked. A unified Reich, with Berlin as its natural capital, cannot fail to evoke the image of Prussia and, with it, inevitably will create a movement for resurrecting Prussia as a state. The bulk of the Western German population has no love for Prussia. To the sections formerly forcibly annexed by Prussia—the *Musspreußen* in Frankfurt or Hanover—the idea of a new Prussia is a nightmare. Konrad Adenauer, who in his younger years was involved in the separation of the Rhineland from Prussia and the Reich, is believed to hate the Prussians only slightly less than the British.

In the G.D.R. the shoe is on the other foot. The government of the Ulbrichts and Grote Wohls disclaims officially and privately any interest in unification and, not without manifest success, concentrates on making the

G.D.R. a Socialist model state. The great mass of the people, except the profiteers of the present regime, may long for unification, chafing as they do under their Soviet-trained and indoctrinated rulers. But in view of recently increased living standards the economic incentives for unification have become dulled. The exodus of refugees into Western Berlin, though still amounting to some eight thousand a month, has abated. Western German statisticians, otherwise so eloquent, are silent on the fact that one out of four refugees sooner or later returns except for the intellectuals who find the regimented life unbearable. After all, the Eastern Germans are likewise Germans, competent, efficient and law-abiding. By now they have resigned themselves to a situation they are unable to change and make the best of it. Moreover, the managers of the G.D.R., prize pupils in the Soviet propaganda school, are well on the way to instilling into the new generation a kind of Socialist *élan vital* far superior to the materialistic complacency all observers deplore among West German youth. In short, if free elections were held now they probably would result in a vast majority in favor of unification. But no revolt will occur as it did in 1953 and the status quo is generally accepted as a permanent fact.

For the last ten years German unification has been the most solid and unpliable plank in the American foreign policy platform. Unpopular as it may seem this question must be faced. Is German unification in the national interest of the United States and would it serve to help preserve world peace? To claim as a self-evident truth that what is bad for the Soviets must be good for the United States is not enough. If accomplished, German unification may raise more issues than does the present split. If it is assumed as it must be that a new Reich, rather than deciding to stay neutral, would join the Western alliance, the domestic problems of Germany would automatically become problems of the West at large. Foremost among these looms the claim for the restoration to Germany of the territories lost to the East and, possibly, also the return of the Sudeten Germans to their former homes. The refugees have built themselves into a formidable pressure group whose collective weight is felt in the elections.

Confronted with the resurgence of a new Reich with seventy and five million people armed with atomic weapons the Eastern states would have no alternative but to return to the Soviets for protection against German territorial claims and economic domination. Unification, thus, would harness the Poles and the Czechs permanently to the Soviet wagon and nullify at once all laborious efforts to pry them loose. For this very reason the British and the French are far less sold on unification than the Americans, and de Gaulle's new-found friendship with Adenauer may well be little more than the Machiavellian realization that the continued rule of the stubborn "Old Man" is the safest guarantee against unification. The only solution that would forestall this danger is the renunciation, on the part of the G.F.R., of the claim to the lost territories. This no German government could, or would, do.

Another problem much neglected abroad has to be mentioned. What kind of a peace treaty would a reunified Germany conclude with the former allies? For the Western allies the problem of reparations is moot in view of their formal renunciation, but not for the Eastern states victimized by the Nazis. And further, on what conditions or obligations to be assumed by a unified Germany should the former allies insist? If the Eastern puppet government should be sent packing, many internal issues would have to be solved in which the Allies have a more than indirect interest. Wholesale retribution against members of the defunct Eastern regime would have to be prevented, whatever may seem their sins. What will become of the socialization of landed wealth and other private property in Eastern Germany? Here the Soviets have an engrossing interest. Possibly the de-communization of the industrial and business sectors of the Eastern economy could be undertaken though this would be by no means easy. But the agrarian reform cannot be undone. The least the expropriated landowners—among them many of the obnoxious feudal junkers—would demand is indemnification for their lost holdings, involving a tremendous burden on Western Germany, affluent as she may be.

This, in turn, could not fail to influence German economic stability in general as well as the continued compensation of the millions of victims of the Nazis for which the G.F.R. has taken responsibility. Many nationals of the Western states would be adversely affected. Moreover, on all these points endless wrangles must ensue between the West and the East which may dwarf their present disunity concerning the issue of reunification. In short, before the functional machinery for a peace treaty can be discussed it may seem imperative to come to an understanding of the immense difficulties its conclusion will bring to the fore.


What conclusion should be drawn by the United States from this realistic picture of German unification untarnished by official mythologies? The Berlin issue, deliberately neglected thus far in this survey, is merely a minor segment of a major issue though one on which the approach to it may hinge.

That the Western powers, under international law, possess the right to remain in Berlin indefinitely seems beyond doubt.⁵ Their right of access—handled in 1945 by General Lucius Clay with a negligence he would hardly have condoned in his subordinates—appears far less certain. However, to use the Soviet text echoed by President Eisenhower in a recent press conference, the Allied presence on an island 100 miles within the East German state is highly "abnormal." The Romans kept their legions on the *limes* running from Bonn to Regensburg on guard against the restless Teutonic tribes for close to two centuries. Will the Western garrisons remain in Berlin for generations to come? To raise this question is to refute it. At least for the Berlin impasse a solution must be found. After endless procrastinations several have been advanced on both sides. Khrushchev's proposal of creating Western Berlin as a "Free City" with guaranteed self government is fraught with dangers for the valiant Western Berliners even though they may be exaggerated. For the proposed occupation of Western Berlin by contingents of the United Nations the Danzig precedent is too discouraging. The U.N. should not be charged with a task which it cannot fulfill in the case of a crisis.

What the Russians want are two conditions: namely, the withdrawal of the West-

⁵ See Karl Loewenstein, *The Allied Presence in Berlin: Legal Basis*, Foreign Policy Bulletin, vol. 38, no. 11 (February 15, 1959).

The Two Germanies



—From *The History of Germany: From the Reformation to the Present Day* by Minna R. Falk, New York, Philosophical Library, 1957.

ern troops from Berlin and the recognition, by the West, of the G.D.R. As to the first: The Western garrisons do not constitute a threat to either the G.D.R. or the U.S.S.R. In case of an armed conflict their military potential is negligible. For the Russians the relinquishment of the Berlin outpost by the West possesses primarily a symbolic value. To use Khrushchev's properly descriptive words, Western withdrawal would liquidate an anachronism. Technically, the Western position is untenable. At any time the garrisons could be forced out if the G.D.R. interrupted the road, rail and water communications. In view of the new electronic disturbances, the success of another airlift is doubtful. The breathing spell assured by the current negotiations may well be used for a way out of the Berlin impasse, in which all cards are stacked against the Western Powers.

The suggestion this writer is submitting—and one he has advanced repeatedly these last years—is that of the withdrawal of the Western occupation forces from Western Berlin and the transfer of responsibility, administratively and politically, to the government of the G.F.R. He has no illusions about the risks involved, but no alternative being open, the plan may be worth serious consideration. The time at long last has come when the G.F.R. should assume the responsibility for what it justly claims to be its territory instead of taking shelter behind the broad back of Uncle Sam. Materially, nothing need be changed in the status of West Berlin, when token contingents of the *Bundeswehr* replace Allied troops. By no stretch of imagination could this be considered surrendering the Western Berliners to communization. In compensation for the Western withdrawal the Soviets and the G.D.R. may well be induced to guarantee the free access to Berlin which Khrushchev has held out in connection with his plan of a "Free City."

This solution offers the tangible chance of serving as a practical testing ground for the cooperation of the Western and the Eastern German governments and their respective city administrations to see whether they can devise, in a limited functional field, common policies for the mutual benefit of the people

of Greater Berlin. If the experiment succeeds it may well encourage the two governments to cooperate on wider and politically more important issues of common German interests. From this pragmatic experience, given good will on both sides, in time a pattern of joint confederal action may eventually emerge. An approximation of the two Germanies, thus, would evolve on a pragmatic basis of trial and error rather than on a conceptual basis of initially spelled out confederal institutions.

There exist obvious difficulties that should not be minimized. The plan probably would have to wait for Adenauer's withdrawal from the political scene just as President Eisenhower's new flexible approach to the U.S.-S.R. had to wait for the disappearance of John Foster Dulles. That a Western German government would use the changing of the guard in Berlin for adventures, military or otherwise, is unlikely, considering the fact that any war in Central Europe, brushfire or megaton, would have to be conducted inside Germany. Finally, American public opinion should be disabused of the propaganda slogan that German unification is vital to the American national interest. The American public is intelligent enough to realize that since the whole loaf of German unification on Western terms is unattainable at this time and for an unforeseeable time to come, a slice of bread is better than none. The forthcoming summit conference cannot work miracles. The most that can be reasonably expected is an interim arrangement for Berlin and not a real solution.

The German people on both sides of the line have resigned themselves to the fact of the two separate and independent German states. They may welcome the solution proposed here as a slight if significant step forward. It may help to overcome their well-founded fear—fully demonstrated by historical experience—that once a new generation has grown up, accustomed to the split personality of Germany, the two segments will grow further apart and develop their own way of life to such an extent that never again will they be able to come together. In the past nations have created states. In our ideological age it may well be that states create nations.

Received At Our Desk

THE COMMUNIST SUBVERSION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1938-1948. By JOSEPH KORBEL. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 258 pages, bibliography and index, \$5.00.)

The Communist coup of February, 1948, ended Czechoslovakia's fleeting, tragic experiment with coexistence and democracy. The author, a former member of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has focused his attention on the decade preceding the absorption of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet empire, and of the persistent efforts by the Communist party to undermine democratic institutions. This is a remarkable case study of Communist duplicity. The history of the Czechoslovak Communist party, its key personalities and tactical machinations, is traced through the interwar period, the second World War, and the 1945-1948 period. Dr. Korbels first hand knowledge adds to the value of the study. The role of Soviet diplomacy in weakening Czechoslovak democracy is discussed. The chapters dealing with Western-Soviet policy decisions which affected the future of Czechoslovakia are particularly useful in shedding light on the events of 1948.

Dr. Korbels holds the Communists principally responsible for the subversion of Czechoslovakia. However, he does acknowledge the pertinence of other factors which were at least as responsible for the inability of the democratic leaders to resist for long the concerted pressure of internal communism and the external force of the Soviet Union. Thus, the following conditions helped the Communists: "The economic and social upheaval of the period of occupation; the liberation by Soviet troops; the Teheran agreements and the memories of Munich; the Sudeten lands and the German estates, available for exploitation by Communist agitators; the existence of an easily divided Marxist oriented Social Democratic party; and,

looming always on the horizon, the ever-present threat of the Soviet Army. All of these conditions, somewhat unique to the case of Czechoslovakia, were thoroughly exploited by the Communists in their brutal assault on Czech democracy, but this probing of every chink in the armor is itself a universal technique of communism." This carefully documented work will prove of great interest to those concerned with the problem of containing communism.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

AUTHORITY AND ORGANIZATION IN GERMAN MANAGEMENT. By HEINZ HARTMANN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 318 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

The economic recovery of West Germany has been one of the most startling of postwar developments. Dr. Hartmann has written a valuable account of the men who dominate German industry. He "explores the strength of German management in terms of its authority, and shows clearly how this authority is, within certain stated limits, self-evident, exclusive, and total." Industrial relations, management development, and administrative approaches are analyzed. The problems of running giant corporations, within the framework of the German political community, are effectively presented. Those interested in the theory and practice of management will find much of value in this impressive study.

A.Z.R.

NATO AND AMERICAN SECURITY. EDITED BY KLAUS KNORR. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 342 pages and index, \$6.00.)

The defense of the Western world continues to rest upon the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Of late, strains within the alliance have be-

come more pronounced. National positions on such questions as the extent to which Nato should rely upon nuclear weapons to deter any Soviet aggression, the problem of establishing missile bases in the Western European countries, the responsibility of Nato for political questions besetting Nato members, and the different concepts of what constitutes a viable military establishment all appear to be growing in importance.

Twelve experts have contributed informative, thoughtful essays on Nato's problems and future. Part I consists of three articles dealing with the strategic background: "The Strained Alliance" by Klaus Knorr, "Nato: The Developing Strategic Context" by Roger Hilsman, and "The U.S.S.R. and Nato" by Cyril E. Black and Frederick J. Yeager. Part II deals with the significant problems confronting Nato in the military and political area. Space precludes a detailed commentary on the essays, especially since they are uniformly excellent. They represent sober, sophisticated, impressive work. It is rare that a series of articles written by different analysts, and treating so wide a range of critical subjects, can be adjudged an unqualified success. This volume will prove an indispensable source for students of international relations. A.Z.R.

THE BATTLE OF FRANCE, 1940. BY COLONEL A. GOUTARD WITH A FOREWORD BY CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART. (New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1959. 280 pages and index, \$4.00.)

This interesting study covers one of the most shocking events of World War II; the sudden collapse of the French Army only a few days after the first real German offensive. The author makes a good case for the thesis that the success of the Blitzkrieg was due neither to the weakness of the individual French soldier nor to any inherent superiority of German arms, but to the incompetence of the French High Command, especially in preparing for a 1914-type war when there were overwhelming indications that the Germans were preparing for something entirely different. Colonel Goutard gives some at-

tention to a comparison of French and German military preparation in the period between World War I and World War II and to the "phony war," but the bulk of the book is devoted to the campaign from the invasion of Belgium to the Dunkirk evacuation. This book is written primarily for the military strategist, but contains much that the casual reader will find of interest.

GEORGE CODDING, JR.
University of Pennsylvania

THE FROZEN REVOLUTION. POLAND: A STUDY IN COMMUNIST DECAY. BY FRANK GIBNEY. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959. 269 pages and index, \$4.75.)

The history of modern Poland is marked by repeated tragedy. Polish independence has fallen victim, first, to Nazi aggression in 1939, and second, to Soviet domination since 1945. In 1956, a bloodless revolution succeeded in transforming Poland from a Soviet satrapy to a nation with a large measure of autonomy in internal affairs. Though still ruled by Communists, Poland is undergoing a period of subdued ferment. The October, 1956, revolution "was more lasting, more complicated to describe, more deadly to communism" than is commonly appreciated.

Frank Gibney, noted reporter and political commentator, has presented the background and aftermath of this revolution with skill, sensitivity, and restraint. His vignettes of Poland are excellent. He holds that the Polish revolution unfortunately never fulfilled its initial promise. The geopolitical realities of Eastern European life, the "self-neutralizing forces in the revolution itself," and the Soviet-American military stalemate, all interacted to rob the Poles of their deserved political fruits.

The narrative accurately and effectively analyzes the drama behind Gomulka's return to power, the manifold economic, social, and political problems besetting the Communist leadership, the significant role played by the Catholic Church, the struggle for survival and expression of the Polish intellectuals, and the importance to Poland of the former German areas lying

east of the Oder-Neisse line, now Poland's western boundary. Mr. Gibney's descriptive—frozen revolution—may be unduly pessimistic. Poland is changing, though at a glacierlike pace. This is a fine account of an important country. A.Z.R.

THE SEIZURE OF POLITICAL POWER. BY FELIX GROSS. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. 398 pages and index, \$4.75.)

This study focuses on the techniques "which have led to the violent transfer and consolidation of power and to the ways in which peoples have struggled against autocracy and seized power." The emphasis is on the "How," that is, how the seizure of power is planned and executed.

Professor Gross has used the Russian revolutionary movement since the early 1800's as a case study. Though other revolutionary movements are given some attention, the principal focus is on Russia. Part I treats the general theoretical framework: "the sociological meaning of power, its significance as a cultural value, its relationship to personality, and its relationship to social, economic, and political conditions." Part II analyzes the development of Russian revolutionary movements and strategies during the nineteenth century and through the revolutions of February and October, 1917. Part II discusses the Communist strategy of revolution and the seizure of power in Eastern Europe and China. In the final section, the author offers some reflections on the problems confronting democratic societies in their attempt to cope with Communist revolutionary activities. Eclectic in character, the study covers a wide area and presents much that is valuable and informative.

A.Z.R.

ROAD OF PROPAGANDA: THE SEMANTICS OF BIASED COMMUNICATION. BY KARIN DOVRING. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 158 pages and notes, \$4.75.)

This is a book about the methods used to influence men's minds. In a period of rapid technological development and intense political hostility, propaganda seeks

to condition human thinking and responses. How is this accomplished? In a chapter on "The Communication Process" the author notes that the communicator must know his society, its values and interests. Once this is understood the problems of gaining the attention, and subsequently the interest of the public can be approached. The process of molding public opinion is a complex one; the objectives are not always in the public interest. The author develops her themes in a clear, interesting manner. The analysis is cogent, perceptive, and thoughtful.

A.Z.R.

SOCIALISM IN SOUTHERN ASIA. BY SAUL ROSE. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 278 pages and index, \$4.50.)

Socialist ideals exert a strong attraction in the underdeveloped world. They promise change and progress. But in the crucible of Asian developments, democratic socialism has not fared too well, as it seeks "to compete with the forces of conservatism, capitalism, communism, and communalism." Dr. Rose has written an excellent account of the state of socialism in Southern Asia. He presents a clear, often discouraging, picture of the socialist parties in this vital area of the world.

The author's approach is largely historical, and he treats each country separately, though there are also two chapters devoted to the Asian Socialist Conferences of 1953 and 1957. He traces the development of Socialist groups in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaya and Singapore. Socialist personalities and programs are discussed. The book contains a wealth of information and will undoubtedly serve as an invaluable reference work for future analyses of this subject; it represents an impressive marriage of investigation and insight.

Asian Socialists are beset with many problems. For example, there is the problem of differentiation which confronts the Indian Socialist Party. "Both the Congress and the Communists professed Socialism, and the Socialists had to chart a course between them: for if the party

echoed either of them it was in danger of losing its identity. In negotiating this tricky passage, it would be outbid by the extremism of the Communists, who at the same time could keep up a siren call for a 'united front'; while from the other side it might be drawn towards co-operation with the Congress."

Fortunately for the Socialists, they have been associated with national liberation movements from the beginning of their independent political existence. This had an important consequence. For nationalism "helped the Socialists to escape from the embrace of the Communists: for it was on this issue, of subordination to Moscow, that they parted company. This involved a reexamination of their ideological position, in the process of which they moved progressively away from Marxism and abandoned the doctrine of violent revolution in favour of peaceful methods."

Whether the Socialists can challenge the position of the extreme left (Communists), while still drawing support from the moderates, remains to be seen. The future orientation of democratic movements in Southern Asia depends upon the extent to which the democratic socialists can gain popular support and upon the effectiveness of their programs and leaders.

A.Z.R.

DECISION FOR CHINA. By PAUL K. T. SIH. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959. 262 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.00.)

Dr. Sih, a Catholic convert, develops the thesis that Christianity is the ultimate answer to China's problems. He acknowledges the contributions of the great spiritual teachers of his country's past, and shows how Christianity is the fulfillment of their teachings. After a brief explanation of the essentials of Chinese culture, the author discusses the Western impact on China. He particularly rues the imposition of "unequal treaties" on China, a development which he feels precluded the greater spread of Christianity. It certainly adversely affected the progress of Christian mission work. In the final two sections,

Dr. Sih discusses the reasons why communism conquered the mainland of China, the challenge it poses, and the difficulties it faces in consolidating its hold over the Chinese people. The author also offers a program for combating communism and eventually bringing democracy to China.

A.Z.R.

THE PERSIAN GULF STATES. By SIR RUPERT HAY. (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1959. 160 pages and index, \$3.75.)

The importance of the Middle East in world politics is well known. Reliable information concerning developments in the Arab countries remains an urgent need. This brief volume, written by a former British administrator who spent many years in the area, is particularly welcome. It is a general account of the oil-rich, tradition-bound, British controlled Persian Gulf States. "They are eleven in number, ten Sheikhdoms and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The ten Sheikhdoms—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial States—are strung out along the western shore of the Persian Gulf, the Trucial States extending to the coast of the Gulf of Oman, while the Sultanate of Muscat occupies all except a small stretch of the western coast of the Gulf of Oman and a large portion of the southern coast of Arabia."

Brief, lucid, informative, the book bears the imprint of experience and objectivity, tinged with an affectionate regard for the peoples and politics being discussed. Sir Hay presents a description of each of the countries with excellent essays on their special relations to Great Britain, their economy and oil interests, and their importance in international relations.

A.Z.R.

KARL MARX: A WORLD WITHOUT JEWS. EDITED BY DAGOBERT D. RUNES. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 51 pages, \$2.75.)

One minor aspect of Marx's writings has consistently been eliminated by publishers of his works: the anti-Semitic statements. Dr. Runes has presented these diatribes for the first time in the English

language. Originally published in Germany in 1843, the anti-Semitic references of Marx were made in conjunction with his over-all indictment of all religions. Though they constitute a minor part of Marx's writings, and have little bearing on his main efforts, they make interesting reading. It is particularly noteworthy that Marx's anti-Semitic statements are now being included by the Soviet State Publishing House in its new editions of Marx's works.

A.Z.R.

NEW ZEALAND IN THE MAKING. By J. B. CONDLIFFE. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959. New York: The Macmillan Co. Second revised edition. 316 pages, notes and index, \$6.75.)

THE WELFARE STATE IN NEW ZEALAND. By J. B. CONDLIFFE. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959. New York: The Macmillan Co. 396 pages, notes and index, \$6.75.)

For over a quarter of a century *New Zealand in the Making* was the standard work on the economic history of the islands "down under." Published in 1930, it covered the economic and social development of the country since the arrival of the first settlers at Wellington in 1840. In two volumes published this year, Professor Condliffe has enhanced the usefulness of his history by thoroughly reworking it and bringing it up to date. The first volume, still called *New Zealand in the Making*, concentrates on economic development during the period 1840 to 1935 but carries the treatment of certain themes, such as the economic status of the Maoris and the evolution of forest policy, down to 1956. The other volume, *The Welfare State in New Zealand*, describes the radical changes wrought by the first Labor government during its long tenure of office (1935-1949) and discusses subsequent developments through 1956. Together the two books present an illuminating picture of a hard-working, practical, yet imaginative people who have never hesitated to strike out on their own in the solution of their social and economic problems.

HENRY WELLS
University of Pennsylvania

THAILAND: AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN SIAM. By NOEL F. BUSCH. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1959. 166 pages and bibliography, \$3.50.)

Thailand was the only country of South-east Asia which preserved its independence during years when the Western Powers ruled the area. Its history, people, customs, religion, arts and pastimes are presented in delightful fashion in this interesting little book. The author writes of his experiences and impressions with humor and affection. For those looking for an informal yet authoritative introduction to exotic Thailand, this book is highly recommended.

A.Z.R.

A SHORT HISTORY OF GERMANY 1815-1945. By E. J. PASSANT. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959. 236 pages, biographical notes and index, \$3.75.)

An excellent brief review of German history from 1815, this well-written sketch is particularly interesting for its account of the end of the Weimar Republic and the subsequent establishment of the Hitler regime.

THE ENDURING LINCOLN. EDITED BY NORMAN A. GRAEBNER. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959. 121 pages and index, \$3.00.)

A collection of four lectures marking the Lincoln Sesquicentennial at the University of Illinois, this small volume adds to the commentary on the significance of Abraham Lincoln. As editor Norman Graebner points out in his preface, "these essays analyze his contribution to the democratic faith, to the principles of functioning democracy, to the management of the presidential office and to the effective use of power and diplomacy in time of war." The essays are written by Roy P. Basler of the Library of Congress, T. Harry Williams of Louisiana State University, David Donald of Columbia University and Norman A. Graebner of the University of Illinois and a contributing editor of *CURRENT HISTORY*.

Current Documents

SUPREME COURT OPINION UPHOLDING THE STEEL STRIKE INJUNCTION

On November 7, 1959, the Supreme Court of the United States, in an 8-1 decision, affirmed the use of the Taft-Hartley provision enjoining the United Steelworkers of America from continuing their 116-day shutdown. The complete text of the Court's opinion ordering 500,000 steelworkers back to their jobs for an eighty-day cooling off period is reprinted below:

Majority Opinion

Per curiam.

The Attorney General sought and obtained in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania an injunction against the continuation of an industry-wide strike of workers in the basic steel industry pursuant to Section 28 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 155, 29 U.S.C. Section 178. We granted certiorari,—U.S.—, to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,—F.2D, affirming the District Court. In pertinent part, section 208 provides that if the District Court—

Find that . . . a threatened or actual strike or lockout—

“(I) Affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several states or with foreign nations, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce; and

“(II) If permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the national health or safety, it shall have jurisdiction to enjoin any such strike or lockout, or the continuing thereof, and to make such other orders as may be appropriate. . . .”

The arguments of the parties here and in the lower courts have addressed themselves in considerable part to the propriety of the District Court's exercising its equitable jurisdiction to enjoin the strike in question once the findings set forth above had been made. These arguments have ranged widely into broad issues of national labor policy, the

availability of other remedies to the executive, the effect of a labor injunction on the collective bargaining process, consideration of the conduct of the parties to the labor dispute in their negotiations, and conjecture as to the course of those negotiations in the future.

We do not believe that Congress in passing the statute intended that the issuance of injunctions should depend upon judicial inquiries of this nature. Congress was not concerned with the merits of the parties' positions or the conduct of their negotiations. Its basic purpose seems to have been to see that vital production should be resumed or continued for a time while further efforts were made to settle the dispute. To carry out its purposes, Congress carefully surrounded the injunction proceedings with detailed procedural devices and limitations.

The public report of a Board of Inquiry, the exercise of political and executive responsibility personally by the President in directing the commencement of injunction proceedings, the statutory provisions looking toward an adjustment of the dispute during the injunction's pendency, and the limited duration of the injunction, represent a Congressional determination of policy factors involved in the difficult problem of national emergency strikes. This Congressional determination of the policy factors is of course binding on the courts.

The statute imposes upon the courts the duty of finding, upon the evidence adduced, whether a strike or lockout meets the statutory conditions of breadth of involvement and peril to the national health or safety. We

have accordingly reviewed the concurrent findings of the two lower courts. Petitioner here contests the findings that the continuation of the strike would imperil the national health and safety. The parties dispute the meaning of the statutory term "national health"; the government insists that the term comprehends the country's general well-being, its economic health; petitioner urges that simply the physical health of the citizenry is meant. We need not resolve the question, for we think the judgment below is amply supported on the ground that the strike imperils the national safety.¹ Here we rely upon the evidence of the strike's effect on specific defense projects; we need not pass on the government's contention that "national safety" in this context should be given a broader construction and application.

The petitioner suggests that a selective reopening of some of the steel mills would suffice to fulfill specific defense needs. The statute was designed to provide a public remedy in times of emergency; we cannot construe it to require that the United States either formulate a reorganization of the affected industry to satisfy its defense needs without the complete reopening of closed facilities, or demonstrate in court the un-

¹ The evidence in this regard is reflected in the District Court's findings of fact Nos. 13 (A), (B), (C), and (D), as follows:

"(A) Certain items of steel required in top priority military missile programs of the United States are not made by any mill now operating, nor available from any inventory or from imports.

Any further delay in resumption of steel production would result in an irretrievable loss of time in the supply of weapons systems essential to the national defense plans of the United States and its allies.

"(B) The planned program of space activities under the direction of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has been delayed by the strike and will be further delayed if it is continued. Specifically, Project Mercury, the nation's manned satellite program, which has the highest national priority, has been delayed by the reason of delay in construction of buildings essential to its operation.

This program is important to the security of the nation. Other planned space programs will be delayed or threatened with delay by a continuation of the strike.

"(C) Nuclear submarines and the naval shipbuilding program other than submarines, including new construction, modernization, and conversion, have been affected by reason of the inability to secure boilers, compressors, and other component parts requiring steel. Products of the steel industry are indispensable to the manufacture of such items and delay in their production will irreparably injure national defense and imperil the national safety.

"(D) Exported steel products are vital to the support of United States bases overseas and for the use of Nato allies and similar collective security groups. The steel strike, if permitted to continue, will seriously impair these programs, thus imperiling the national safety."

feasibility of such a reorganization. There is no room in the statute for this requirement which the petitioner seeks to impose on the government.

We are of the opinion that the provision in question as applied here is not violative of the constitutional limitation prohibiting courts from exercising powers of a legislative or executive nature, powers not capable of being conferred upon a court exercising solely "the judicial power of the United States." Petitioner contends that the statute is constitutionally invalid because it does not set up any standard of lawful or unlawful conduct on the part of labor or management. But the statute does recognize certain rights in the public to have unimpeded for a time production in industries vital to the national health or safety. It makes the United States the guardian of these rights in litigation. The availability of relief, in the common judicial form of an injunction, depends on findings of fact, to be judicially made. Of the matters decided judicially, there is no review by other agencies of the government. We conclude that the statute entrusts the courts only with the determination of a "case or controversy," on which the judicial power can operate, not containing any element capable of only legislative or executive determination. We do not find that the termination of the injunction after a specified time, or the machinery established in an attempt to obtain a peaceful settlement of the underlying dispute during the injunction's pendency, detracts from this conclusion.

The result is that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming that of the District Court, is affirmed. Our mandate shall issue forthwith.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan: In joining the court's opinion we note our intention to file in due course an amplification of our views upon the issues involved. . . .

Justice Douglas dissented.

The editors regret that an error appeared in the third sentence of Michael T. Florinsky's article, page 262, in the November, 1959, issue. The sentence should read: "The broad lines of the doctrine which governs the decisions of the Kremlin are by now generally familiar; its basic proposition pertinent to this discussion is the impending and inevitable doom of the capitalist society which would be inexorably superseded by world communism."

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of November, 1959, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

African Regional Labor Conference

Nov. 15—The second African Regional Labor Conference reaffirms its loyalty to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

Berlin Crisis

Nov. 5—East Germany's Communist organ, *Neues Deutschland*, announces that it appears unlikely that East Germany will fly its new flag over the West Berlin elevated railways.

Nov. 18—At private talks at Chequers which began last night, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano settle differences with British leaders. Adenauer tells British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that German fears of British support for a demilitarized Central European zone have been allayed. Von Brentano tells British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd that Germany plans to keep strong ties to the Nato alliance, European community ties notwithstanding.

Nov. 19—Adenauer flies back to Germany from Britain. It is reported that Adenauer has finally agreed that a summit conference should include discussion of an interim Berlin settlement.

Nov. 27—Soviet Ambassador to France Sergei A. Vinogradov says that the Soviet Union has not changed its desire to hold a summit conference as soon as possible; he states that the Soviet Union is willing to schedule a summit meeting either before or after Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's visit to France.

Colombo Plan

Nov. 13—The eleventh conference of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo plan votes to retain the Colombo Plan organization until 1966.

Disarmament

Nov. 2—The U.S. says it will elaborate its

reasons for wanting to go over the system of detecting underground tests.

Nov. 3—The U.S.S.R. says it will take part in discussing a new means of detecting underground nuclear tests.

Nov. 9—Off-the-record talks on a nuclear test ban begin in Geneva.

Nov. 22—Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission John A. McCone favors an extension of the U.S. nuclear test ban on a week-to-week basis.

Nov. 26—President Eisenhower says that the value of a disarmament agreement would outweigh the risks of evasion.

Nov. 30—The U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union agree on details of the establishment of a control organization to be established when a nuclear test ban treaty is signed.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Nov. 9—Poland is admitted as an associate member of Gatt.

Nov. 19—The U.S. is asked to consider seriously the international effects of her farm price support program.

Nov. 20—As the fifteenth session of Gatt ends, the U.S. asks other nations to lower barriers against sales of U.S. goods.

International Committee on Radiation Protection

Nov. 1—It is revealed in Washington that the 15-nation International Committee on Radiation Protection and the U.S. National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurement have reached agreement on permissible radiation exposure for the general public; exposure limits remain at the present recommended levels.

Nato

Nov. 5—Nato Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak asks the Western Big Four powers to consider the views of all Nato members in preparing for an East-West summit meeting.

Nov. 10—Nato representatives plan a special foreign ministers' meeting December 22 to hear a report on the Western Big Four talks.

Nov. 19—Paul-Henri Spaak asks Nato to plan a program of aid for underdeveloped areas.

Organization of American States

Nov. 18—Mexico's Vicente Sanchez Gavito is elected President of the O.A.S. council.

United Nations

Nov. 2—The General Assembly's Political Committee endorses a resolution to refer disarmament suggestions to a 10-nation disarmament group to meet in Geneva early in 1960.

Nov. 5—Twelve new nations join the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization.

Nov. 8—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld reveals plans to go to Laos.

Nov. 17—The General Assembly records "deep regret and concern" because of racial conflict in South Africa; *apartheid* is condemned in a vote of 62 to 3 with 7 abstentions. Britain, France and Portugal vote against condemning *apartheid*.

Nov. 20—The General Assembly adopts the Declaration of the Rights of the Child.

The General Assembly votes to express "grave concern" over the projected French A-bomb test in the Sahara Desert.

Nov. 21—The General Assembly asks all nations to refrain from nuclear tests while waiting for a British-Russian-American nuclear test ban agreement.

Nov. 23—The U.S. reveals plans to donate an additional contribution of \$3 million to maintain the U.N. Emergency Force in Egypt.

Nov. 25—The General Assembly votes 51 to 10 with 15 abstentions and 6 absences to discuss the Hungarian question.

The General Assembly votes to postpone debate on changes in the U.N. Charter.

West Europe

Nov. 1—A Nordic Council session opens in Stockholm.

Nov. 5—Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland complete a draft treaty for a free trade

area outside the European Common Market area.

Nov. 7—Closing a session, the Nordic Council recommends a study of Nordic economic cooperation; Norway, Denmark, and Sweden are now members of the Outer Seven free trade area.

Nov. 13—Finland reveals plans to seek a form of non-member participation in the Outer Seven free trade group.

Nov. 16—British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan says that Britain "is part of Europe," supporting plans for Western economic unity.

Nov. 18—The President of the British Board of Trade praises the establishment of the European Free Trade Association (the Outer Seven).

Nov. 20—A Convention setting up the European Free Trade Association is completed and initialled.

Nov. 24—The European Common Market nations extend their import-quota liberalization plans to include the U.S. and other Western nations.

ARGENTINA

Nov. 23—Minister of the Economy Alvaro C. Alsogaray reports on the results of his money-raising trip abroad. A 1960 package loan to be negotiated with European banks and the U.S. International Monetary Fund is scheduled.

BELGIUM

Nov. 3—A meeting between Congolese nationalist leaders and Belgian officials is announced for later this month. Minister for the Congo August de Schryver tells the Belgian Parliament that he will lead the conference.

Belgian Congo

Nov. 1—Leader of the Congolese National Movement Patrice Lumumba is arrested. A 2-day police hunt for Lumumba sparked rioting over the weekend.

Nov. 5—The Belgian Chamber of Deputies votes support for the government's policy to give independence to the Belgian Congo.

Nov. 22—Belgian Minister for the Congo de Schryver arrives in Leopoldville to confer with nationalist leaders.

Nov. 23—The Abako party and a branch of the Congo National Movement refuse to participate in communal elections scheduled for next month. They urge that the Congo receive independence at once.

Nov. 26—Minister for the Congo de Schryver declares that round-table discussions between African nationalists and government officials will take place after next month's community elections.

Ruanda-Urundi

Nov. 9—It is reported that civil war continues between 2 million Bantu Bagutus and Watusi tribesmen.

Nov. 10—Minister of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi de Schryver outlines a program to give greater independence to Ruanda-Urundi.

Nov. 12—A state of emergency is declared in Ruanda.

Nov. 19—The Belgian Chamber of Deputies approves the government's program for Ruanda-Urundi.

Nov. 27—Belgian Minister for the Congo de Schryver leaves the Belgian Congo to visit this trusteeship.

BRAZIL

Nov. 26—Brazil and Argentina sign a trade treaty to increase imports from one another. It is announced that yesterday the two countries signed a cultural agreement.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE

Australia

Nov. 6—The Australian News and Information Bureau reveals that Australian farm production has increased 46 per cent above the pre-World War II level.

Nov. 12—Queen Elizabeth II names Viscount Dunrossil as Governor General, to replace Field Marshal Slim.

Nov. 20—Defense Minister Athol Gordon Townley explains to Parliament the plan to end national military service.

Ceylon

Nov. 22—Prime Minister Wijayananda Dahanayake admits that he may soon be forced out of office. Finance Minister Stanley de Zoysa resigns following the arrest of his brother in connection with

the assassination of Bandaranaike.

Nov. 24—The death penalty abolished in May, 1956, is restored; the state of emergency is extended.

Nov. 27—The Government defeats a censure motion by one vote.

Ghana

Nov. 4—The Ministers of Ghana Bill is passed, giving Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah wider authority over members of his administration.

Great Britain

Nov. 2—The Government's Betting and Gambling Bill provides licensed betting shops in an effort to eliminate bookmakers and runners.

The London Gazette announces that Herbert Morrison has taken the title Baron Morrison of Lambeth.

Nov. 4—President of the Board of Trade Reginald Maulding reveals that remaining quantitative import controls will be removed Nov. 9 on 25 groups of items from West Europe, the U.S. and almost all other nations except the Communist bloc and Japan. Tariffs are not effected.

Nov. 5—British statesman and author Philip J. Noel-Baker wins the 1959 Nobel Peace Prize for his years of work for disarmament.

Nov. 12—After a 2-day visit to Paris, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and French leaders announce a better understanding on European policies.

Nov. 16—Macmillan praises Europe's steps toward economic unity and says Britain shares "the life and tradition of Europe."

Nov. 17—Commons endorses the Government's plan for licensed off-track betting. German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer is welcomed in London.

Nov. 18—It is announced that Prime Minister Harold Macmillan plans an African visit in January.

India

Nov. 4—An Indian note to Peking rejects Chinese claims to Indian border territory and denies that Indian troops provoked conflict at Ladakh. (See also *People's Republic of China*.)

Nov. 5—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru says "none of us can envisage" war with

China, but declares that India is ready for "strong action."

Nov. 13—U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter explains that his statement about the Indian-Chinese border dispute was not meant "to imply any condonement by the United States Government of the use of force by the Chinese Communists." (See also *United States, Foreign Policy*, Nov. 12).

Nov. 17—The Foreign Ministry charges that threats and duress were used by the Chinese on the captive Indian border policemen.

Nov. 20—Nehru proposes an interim understanding on the Chinese-Indian border dispute and rejects the most recent Chinese proposals for a settlement. He proposes mutual troop withdrawal but refuses to talk to Chinese Premier Chou En-lai until Chinese troops have left Indian territory.

Nov. 22—The U.S. General Accounting Office claims that U.S. aid to India has "basic shortcomings," including "ineffective use of certain aid goods." India is accused of "deficient reporting" on the aid program's status.

Nov. 25—Nehru pleads for national unity against the "grave problems" of the Chinese-Indian border dispute.

Nov. 26—The Commonwealth Relations Office reveals plans for an additional British loan to India of \$53.2 million.

Nov. 27—Nehru promises to protect Nepal against aggression.

New Zealand

Nov. 3—Finance Minister Arnold Nordmeyer announces the removal of sales taxes on beer, cigarettes and tobacco and a reduction of the customs duty on gasoline.

Nov. 22—Municipal election results show a swing against the Labor party.

Pakistan

Nov. 18—President Mohammad Ayub Khan arrives in Turkey for a 2-day official visit, after a conference of Pakistan, Turkish and Iranian leaders in Teheran. (See also *Iran*.)

Union of South Africa

Nov. 13—The newly-organized Progressive

party approves a constitution agreeing to a qualified franchise for nonwhites; its membership is open to nonwhites. Broad general principles are announced, including maintenance of Western civilization and protection of basic human rights.

Nov. 27—The Government announces the establishment of a Council for Colored Affairs, with 27 colored members to advise the government on matters of interest to the nonwhite population.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

Cameroons

Nov. 7—A U.N. plebiscite is held in the Northern Cameroons; a population of some 762 thousand vote either to integrate with independent Nigeria next year or to remain a British trust territory.

Nov. 9—The people of the Northern Cameroons vote 67,879 to 41,113 to remain under British trusteeship.

Cyprus

Nov. 2—Conferences on a constitution for Cyprus are resumed.

Nov. 15—Greek Cypriotes form the Cyprus Democratic Union to oppose Archbishop Makarios in the December presidential elections.

Nov. 26—John Clerides reveals that he will be the candidate of the Democratic Union for the presidency.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Nov. 2—British Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod reveals that the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have been asked to confer in London in November; Macleod will visit these colonies and Kenya in December.

Nov. 5—Prime Minister Roy Welensky rejects a British Labor party request to postpone the review of the Federation's constitution, now scheduled for 1960.

Kenya

Nov. 10—Governor Sir Patrick Renison reveals plans to end the 7-year state of emergency early in 1960; he asks for "a new approach to the future."

Nigeria

Nov. 1—Parliament is dissolved; new elections will be held December 13.

West Indies Federation

Nov. 6—The Jamaica House of Representatives rejects a plan for a strong federal West Indian government.

CAMBODIA

Nov. 22—Prince Norodom Sihanouk ends a visit to Cairo where he talked with U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser. He will leave the United Arab Republic for Yugoslavia tomorrow.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

Nov. 8—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev tells foreign newsmen that the Indian-Chinese border dispute concerns an insignificant area. (See also *British Commonwealth, India*.)

Nov. 9—Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai urges an Indian-Chinese troop drawback from the disputed border territory in a letter to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Chou urges that both sides withdraw 12 miles back of the McMahon line and that the two leaders confer on their border fight.

Nov. 13—It is reported in the Communist paper, *Jenmin Jihpao*, that the Tibetan regional government has approved a land distribution program.

Nov. 14—Red Chinese troops in east Ladakh free 10 Indian prisoners.

Nov. 16—Prime Minister Nehru refuses to meet with Chou to discuss the Red Chinese troop withdrawal offer.

Nov. 23—It is reported by Polish Communists recently returned from Red China's tenth anniversary celebration that the Chinese Communists will not allow Soviet Premier Khrushchev to discuss Asian problems at a summit conference in which they do not participate.

The Peking radio announces that a 5-month drought has caused a tremendous crop loss in Hupeh Province.

Nov. 29—Communist China broadcasts charges that on November 26, U.S. officials kidnapped a member of the Red Chinese Consulate staff, Chang Chien-yuh, in Bombay, India. The U.S. has charged that the Chinese Reds kidnapped a U.S. marine on November 27, detaining him some 6 hours. (See also *United States, Foreign Policy*.)

COSTA RICA

Nov. 10—President Mario Echandi announces that Costa Rica will sell excess military arms to the United States in exchange for tractors.

Nov. 13—Costa Rica announces that it plans to protest a border incursion by Nicaraguan guards last night.

CUBA

Nov. 1—The U.S. initiates new steps to prevent illegal flights to Cuba.

Nov. 2—The government expropriates 75,000 acres of land, including 10,000 acres on which a U.S. company holds mineral rights.

Nov. 3—The U.S. State Department declares that it will not tolerate Cuban refugees establishing an exiled, provisional government in the U.S.

Nov. 4—U.S. F.B.I. agents hold Cuban Major Pedro Diaz Lanz on murder charges. On October 21, the major flew one of the planes that dropped leaflets and alleged explosives over Havana.

Nov. 7—The ambassador to Venezuela is recalled.

Nov. 9—The U.S. accuses Cuba of false charges against the U.S. because of the October 21 bombing.

Nov. 13—Air Force Chief Major Juan Almeida is named Army Chief of Staff.

Nov. 19—Premier Fidel Castro, at the opening of the tenth national labor congress, declares that the property of all counter-revolutionaries will be seized.

Nov. 21—A new law reduces the size of lands held by big oil companies for exploration, and imposes a 60 per cent government royalty on oil produced.

Nov. 22—The Cuban Confederation of Labor, meeting at its tenth national congress, approves a 4 per cent deduction from workers' salaries to promote Cuba's industrial program. The C.C.L. also withdraws from the Inter-American Regional Organization of Labor and proposes to establish a Latin American revolutionary workers labor group.

Nov. 26—Major Ernesta Guevara is appointed head of the National Bank of Cuba; he also holds the post of chief of the industrial section of the Agrarian Reform Institute.

FRANCE

Nov. 4—French delegate to the U.N. Jules Moch tells the General Assembly's Political Committee that France plans to hold a nuclear test in the Sahara. France will only renounce nuclear tests if Britain, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. abandon nuclear armament.

Nov. 5—Import restrictions on some 200 goods from the U.S., Canada and West Europe are lifted by the French government.

Britain tells the General Assembly's Political Committee that France plans to test an A (not an H) bomb in the Sahara.

Nov. 6—The National Assembly receives the 1960 budget.

Nov. 10—President Charles de Gaulle declares that Soviet Premier Khrushchev's French visit is scheduled for March 15. The Khrushchev visit will precede an East-West summit conference.

Nov. 15—The congress of the Union for the New Republic, the Gaullist movement, supports de Gaulle's Algerian policy.

Nov. 18—A \$308 million budget item to build atomic military strength is announced.

Nov. 20—An Asian-African sponsored resolution is passed in the U.N. General Assembly, disapproving of the French atom test in the Sahara.

Nov. 25—The French Senate votes to deprive Senator Francois Mitterrand of his parliamentary immunity, following an alleged attempt on his life last month. The government plans to try Mitterrand for a faked assassination supposedly planned to embarrass the French Right-wing.

Nov. 28—The Chamber of Deputies does not muster a majority vote on a motion of censure on Premier Michel Debré's 1960 budget; Debré thus survives his first crisis.

Ex-Deputy Robert Pesquet is arrested. Pesquet claims he was involved in the fake assassination attempt on Mitterrand's life.

Algeria

Nov. 3—The Central Committee of the French Communist party reverses its position and supports de Gaulle's proposal for Algeria's self-determination.

Nov. 4—Delegate General Paul Delouvrier announces a 38 per cent budget increase

in 1960 of French expenditures for Algerian development—a total outlay of \$506 million.

Nov. 6—The French Army announces that the Algerian rebel chief in Kabylia is dead; all 6 Algerian rebel zones are bereft of their field commanders.

Nov. 11—Right-wing extremists in Algeria stage a 3-hour anti-de Gaulle demonstration, and are dispersed by troops.

Nov. 12—Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba urges Algerian Provisional Government leaders to accept de Gaulle's offer of a cease-fire.

Nov. 20—The Algerian Provisional Government authorizes five rebel leaders held prisoner by France to discuss a cease-fire in Algeria. President de Gaulle rejects this proposal.

Nov. 21—The U.S. grants visas to 3 Algerian nationalists who form a delegation to the U.N. France protests to the U.S.

FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY, THE

Congo Republic

Nov. 27—Premier Fulbert Youlou commemorates the first year of independence for this republic.

Ivory Coast

Nov. 12—Premier Felix Houphouet-Boigny talks with President Eisenhower in Washington. Houphouet-Boigny declares that the French overseas states seek stronger ties to the West.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (East)

Nov. 1—Bishop Otto Dibelius leads religious services in East Berlin despite the Communists' threat.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Nov. 12—Soviet notes to Britain, France and the U.S. are made public: the U.S.S.R. opposes West German plans for operating a radio station in West Berlin.

Nov. 23—France apologizes for halting a German freighter November 4 headed for Morocco.

Nov. 24—An agreement providing for \$545 million in trade in 1960 between East and West Germany is reached.

GUINEA

- Nov. 9—President Sékou Touré ends a 2-week visit to the U.S.
- Nov. 17—The West German government agrees to a technical cooperation program with Guinea at the close of Touré's 2-day visit to Bonn.
- Nov. 21—Touré, in Moscow, sees the end of colonialism in Africa.

HUNGARY

- Nov. 23—It is reported that the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers party has tried 39 cases. Eleven persons have already lost their party membership.
- Nov. 29—Soviet Premier Khrushchev arrives in Hungary to attend the seventh congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers (Communist) party.
- Nov. 30—First Secretary of the Communist party Janos Kadar addresses the opening of the party congress. Kadar states that Soviet troops will remain in Hungary until international tensions are eased.

ICELAND

- Nov. 19—Premier Emil Jonsson resigns. Independence party leader Olafur Thors agrees to try to form a coalition government.
- Nov. 20—Thors announces he has formed a Cabinet.

INDONESIA

- Nov. 18—Indonesia charges that the Red Chinese Embassy staff is inciting alien Chinese in Indonesia.

IRAN

- Nov. 6—Iran and Jordan agree to preserve mutual security.
- Nov. 16—Pakistan President Mohammed Ayub Khan and Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes meet in Teheran with the Shah of Iran. The 3 leaders agree to a policy of non-interference.

IRAQ

- Nov. 14—Premier Abdul Karim Kassim, in a nationwide broadcast, states that Iraq has rid itself of imperialism by leaving the Baghdad Pact.
- Nov. 16—In an interview in the Baghdad

newspaper *Al Thawra*, Premier Kassim is reported as favoring union with Syria and Jordan, the "Fertile Crescent" plan.

ISRAEL

- Nov. 3—Elections to Israel's 120-member Knesset are held.
- Nov. 4—Israel announces an air fight between U.A.R. and Israeli planes.
- Nov. 11—Final results in the November 3 elections give Premier David Ben-Gurion's Mapai party a total of 47 seats, a gain of 7; the two runner-up parties are the Herut (17 seats) and the National Religious Front (12 seats). The rest of the seats are divided among several other parties.
- Nov. 12—Ben-Gurion criticizes Indian Prime Minister Nehru for failing to establish diplomatic ties with Israel.
- Nov. 13—The Mixed Armistice Commission announces that Israeli planes are responsible for the air clash with U.A.R. planes.
- Nov. 28—Michael S. Comay is named Israel's permanent representative to the U.N., replacing Abba Eban.
- Nov. 30—Comay offers to discuss the Palestine refugee problem with the Arab countries encircling Israel.

ITALY

- Nov. 7—The Cabinet decides that President Giovanni Gronchi should accept an invitation to visit the Soviet Union.
- Nov. 9—Italy tells the U.S.S.R. that Gronchi will visit the U.S.S.R., but does not want Soviet Premier Khrushchev to reciprocate the visit.
- Nov. 26—Premier Antonio Segni announces a 5-year agricultural reform program.

Somalia

- Nov. 9—The Italian representative tells the U.N. Trusteeship Committee that an independent Somalia will be established before the December 2, 1960, deadline.

JAPAN

- Nov. 27—Some 20,000 students and unionists march on the Japanese Diet to demand an end to the Japanese security treaty with the U.S. About 400 persons are injured during the rioting.

JORDAN

- Nov. 7—It is announced that the U.S. will

give Jordan 4 payments of \$4 million each to meet a budget deficit during the next 4 months beginning with December.

KOREA, SOUTH

Nov. 24—The 14 countries that fought in Korea place a resolution before the U.N. Political Committee urging a reunification settlement in Korea.

LAOS

Nov. 4—It is reported that France, Britain and the U.S. will not raise the Laotian question in the Security Council because of U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld's forthcoming trip to the area. Prince Regent Savang Vathana is named King, succeeding King Sisavang Vong, who died October 29.

Nov. 6—The U.N. fact-finding committee's report on Laos is released. The 32-page report fails to uphold Laotian charges of wholesale aggression by Vietnamese troops in support of Pathet Lao rebels. The committee report notes that Laotian rebels received arms and supplies from North Vietnamese, but the evidence furnished to the subcommittee did not substantiate charges that North Vietnamese troops had crossed the Laotian border.

Nov. 9—The Soviet Union votes its opposition to U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjöld's plan to visit Laos.

Nov. 12—Hammarskjöld arrives in Laos.

Nov. 13—Hammarskjöld meets with Laotian Premier Phoui Sananikone.

Nov. 15—Hammarskjöld names an economist and Executive Secretary of the U.N. Commission for Europe, Sakari S. Tuomioja, his special representative to Laos.

Nov. 17—Tuomioja arrives in Laos.

Nov. 21—Hammarskjöld returns to New York.

LEBANON

Nov. 19—Israel frees a Lebanese plane it had intercepted.

MEXICO

Nov. 22—The Soviet Industrial Exposition opens in Mexico City. A Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, visiting Mexico, is making a tour of that country's steel and oil industries.

Nov. 28—Mikoyan departs for the Soviet Union.

MOROCCO

Nov. 3—Premier Abdullah Ibrahim returns from a month-long visit to the U.S.

Nov. 13—Morocco and the Soviet Union sign an agreement to trade \$6 million worth of goods.

Nov. 27—Morocco thanks the U.S. for an arms gift.

NETHERLANDS, THE

Nov. 7—The U.S.S.R. signs a \$750 million trade agreement with the Netherlands for 1960.

PANAMA

Nov. 3—Demonstrators in Panama stage anti-U.S. riots. The rioters attempt to place Panamanian flags in the Canal Zone.

Nov. 4—Panama rejects the U.S. protest on anti-American agitation in Panama yesterday.

President Ernesto de la Guardia Jr. broadcasts to the Panama people, telling them that they should pursue their rights by negotiation, not violence.

Nov. 10—It is reported that Panama police did not disperse the anti-American rioters by order of Panama's government.

Nov. 16—U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter tells the Panamanian Ambassador that U.S. nationals must be protected.

Nov. 21—U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State Livingston T. Merchant confers with President de la Guardia.

Nov. 28—Panamanian demonstrators, trying to enter the Canal Zone, are dispersed by National Guardsmen and U.S. troops.

PARAGUAY

Nov. 21—Opposition party leaders meeting in Buenos Aires form a coalition aimed at the eventual ouster of Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner.

PHILIPPINES, THE

Nov. 10—Elections for 8 of the 24 Senate seats are held.

Nov. 14—Incomplete returns give President Carlos P. Garcia's Nationalist party 5 of the 8 seats up for re-election.

POLAND

- Nov. 2—It is reported that the U.S.S.R. will send meat to Poland to alleviate the Polish shortage.
- Nov. 3—It is reported that the U.S. will sell 200,000 tons of fodder grains to Poland.
- Nov. 5—It is reported that the U.S. will carry on a research program in Poland to help that country develop its agricultural productivity.
- Nov. 12—Poland orders the removal of *New York Times* correspondent in Warsaw, A. M. Rosenthal, for "probing reporting."
- Nov. 17—Poland announces that it will buy \$17 million worth of wheat and barley from Canada.
- Nov. 22—It is reported that a high-ranking intelligence officer, Colonel Pawel Monat, defected to the West last summer.
- Nov. 23—The U.S. State Department declares that Colonel Monat has sought asylum in the U.S.
- Nov. 25—Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz, at the opening of the Parliament, sets forth an economic austerity program.

SAUDI ARABIA

- Nov. 11—The Governor of Saudi Arabia's monetary Agency, on leave from his duties as Middle East Director of the International Monetary Fund, Anwar Ali, declares that after 18 months of economic restrictions, Saudi Arabia has achieved a good measure of fiscal recovery.
- Nov. 12—A spokesman for King Saud states that Saud disapproves of keeping U.N. troops in the Gulf of Aqaba.

SUDAN, THE

- Nov. 17—The first year of military rule is marked. Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud declares that he has promoted economic recovery.

TIBET

- Nov. 17—It is reported that the exiled Dalai Lama would like to meet with U.S. President Eisenhower during the latter's forthcoming visit to India.

TUNISIA

- Nov. 8—In national elections, President Habib Bourguiba is re-elected by an over-

whelming vote. Neo-Destour candidates are also given wide support.

U.S.S.R., THE

- Nov. 1—U.S. novelist Erskine Caldwell reveals that he has collected royalties from the U.S.S.R.
- Nov. 7—The U.S.S.R. stages a parade in celebration of the 42nd year of Communist rule.
- Nov. 9—The U.S.S.R. declares that France's plans for an atom test explosion may damage any improvement in East-West ties.
- Nov. 11—Reliable sources report that the U.S.S.R. has offered Iran 85 per cent of the profits in exchange for oil rights in north Iran. The U.S.S.R. also reportedly has stipulated that no foreign military bases are to be permitted in Iran.
- Nov. 14—The Russians report that they have lost contact with the moon rocket.
- Nov. 16—At a conference of the American Rocket Society, visiting Soviet scientists declare that they now have the know-how to send a man into space, but will postpone such an experiment until safety guarantees are increased.
- Nov. 17—In a speech to newspapermen, Premier Khrushchev asserts that the Soviet Union is manufacturing at least 250 rockets with hydrogen warheads each year.
- Nov. 18—It is reported that an American novelist has been given space in the Soviet publication *Literaturnnaya Gazeta* to rebut a review of his editorship of Mark Twain's autobiography.
A First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, arrives in Mexico to open the Soviet Industrial Exposition.
- Nov. 19—Head of the Soviet Administration for Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy Vasily S. Yemelyanov, on a tour of U.S. atomic research centers, urges a cooperative nuclear research program with the U.S.
- Nov. 20—U.S. A.E.C. Chairman John A. McCone and Yemelyanov reach agreement on a joint Soviet-U.S. program to develop peaceful uses for atomic energy. The 2 governments involved must approve such an agreement.
- Nov. 21—The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. sign an agreement for a 2-year extension of

cultural, sport, scientific, educational and technical exchanges.

Nov. 27—Khrushchev initiates helicopter service between the Moscow airport and the Kremlin.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Nov. 1—It is reported in Cairo that Moscow will build all 3 stages of the Aswan Dam. The Soviet loan of \$92 million was intended for the first stage only.

Nov. 8—The Sudan and the U.A.R. reach agreement on the distribution of the Nile waters. The U.A.R. will give the Sudan \$43 million compensation for Sudanese lands flooded by the Aswan High Dam.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Nov. 9—The Department of Agriculture issues a farm outlook report indicating a 15 per cent decline in farm income in 1959, and a possible 7.5 per cent drop in 1960.

Nov. 10—A five point farm policy program is released by the White House, including recommendations for expanded plans for voluntary acreage retirement; realistic price supports on storable products related to average prices in the last three years; discontinuance of acreage controls and marketing quotas; a vigorous "feed program."

Civil Rights

Nov. 16—A suit filed under the 1957 Civil Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment in the Memphis Tennessee federal district court asks a court order to prevent all-white primaries in Fayette County, Tennessee.

Economy

Nov. 18—Budget Director Maurice H. Stans reveals that "the odds are now against a balanced budget this year" because of the steel strike. The deficit may reach some \$600,000,000 for fiscal 1960. Stans also reveals that the 1961 fiscal budget may reach some \$81 billion.

Nov. 25—The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the U.S. Consumer Price Index reached a record high in mid-October, the sixth increase in seven months.

Foreign Policy

Nov. 4—President Eisenhower says he plans to visit nine nations on his December tour.

Nov. 5—Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy plans to go with the President on his 9-nation tour and will therefore delay his resignation.

Nov. 6—In Moscow, conferences open between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on a scientific, technical and cultural exchange agreement. (See the U.S.S.R., November 21.)

Nov. 11—Eisenhower reveals plans to visit Spain and Tunisia also in December.

Nov. 12—Secretary of State Christian Herter says the U.S. lacks sufficient evidence to take a stand on the Indian-Chinese border dispute.

Nov. 14—The President reveals the establishment of a 6-member National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs.

Nov. 16—Christian Herter says that the new "Buy American" policy will be applied to development project funds distributed by the International Cooperation Administration.

Nov. 18—Vance Brand, managing director of the Development Loan Fund, maintains that "other strong industrial countries" can finance their own exports to underdeveloped areas, in explaining the new U.S. position on "tied loans."

Nov. 24—The U.S. and the Soviet Union agree on a cooperative program of nuclear research.

Nov. 26—After publishing some of Herter's statements in Russian newspapers, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* attack his foreign policies.

Nov. 27—In Bombay, a U.S. marine who was escorting a Chinese Communist defector is held in the consulate of the Chinese Communists for 6 hours.

Nov. 28—The U.S. asks India to investigate the seizure of an American marine by Chinese Communists in Bombay.

The White House reveals that the President plans some 30 public speeches during his 11-nation tour.

Nov. 30—President Eisenhower gets bipartisan congressional approval for his forthcoming trip abroad. The White House announces that he will explain the purpose of his trip in a 15-minute nation-wide broadcast before he leaves.

Government

- Nov. 1—Earl W. Kintner, chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, says that his staff is to be doubled for 24-hour monitoring of television commercials.
- Nov. 2—Columbia University teacher Charles Van Doren admits that he was coached in advance for his winning appearances on the television quiz show, "Twenty-one." Fixed quiz shows are being investigated by a House subcommittee investigating the federal regulatory agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission.
- Nov. 4—Defense Secretary Neil McElroy names Charles L. Critchfield as director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, succeeding Roy W. Johnson.
- Nov. 6—Informed Washington sources reveal the selection of Walter Dowling to succeed David K. E. Bruce as U.S. Ambassador to West Germany.
- Nov. 8—Senator William Langer of North Dakota dies at 73.
- Nov. 9—Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, warns that a weed-killer has contaminated part of the nation's cranberry crop.
- Nov. 10—The Federal Communications Commission intensifies its investigation of television procedures.
- Nov. 12—President Eisenhower begins a working vacation in Augusta, Georgia.
- Nov. 14—Charles Critchfield refuses the appointment as head of the Advanced Research Projects Agency.
- Nov. 19—Republican C. Norman Brunson is named to fill the Senate vacancy created by William Langer's death.
- Nov. 20—Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission John C. Doerfer warns the television and radio industry that stricter federal regulations are being planned.
- Nov. 21—President Eisenhower names General Williston B. Palmer as Director of Military Assistance with the same status as the Army, Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Staff.
- Nov. 23—Edward Page Jr. is named as United States Minister to Bulgaria, ending an almost 10-year interruption in relations between the two countries.

- Nov. 26—The Census Bureau estimates that the population of the U.S. will pass the 179 million mark on November 27.
- Nov. 29—State Department officials reveal that the President will ask for some \$4 billion in foreign aid in the fiscal 1961 budget.
- Nov. 30—The Senate publishes its payroll for the first time in 11 years; 19 senators have relatives on their payroll.
After a conference in Denver, representatives of 7 large cities and leading commuter railroads draft a 4-point program of aid to suburban rail service.

Labor

- Nov. 3—The Supreme Court hears the steel case.
- Nov. 7—A Supreme Court decision upholds a Taft-Hartley act injunction ordering steelworkers back to work (For the text of this decision see pages 51-52 of this issue).
United Steelworkers chief David J. McDonald orders union members to return to work.
- Nov. 8—Secretary of Labor James Mitchell says that if the steel strike is not settled during the 80-day cooling off period, the President will suggest to Congress other ways of ending the strike.
- Nov. 9—Small quantities of finished steel are shipped.
- Nov. 11—James Mitchell eats a hat made of cake because October unemployment was higher than he had estimated. In April he pledged that he would eat his hat if October unemployment was not less than 3 million and if the employed did not number more than 67 million. October figures were: 3.272 million unemployed and 66.831 million employed.
The President asks his board of inquiry in the steel case to reconvene.
- Nov. 13—Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act included in the new labor act go into effect.
- Nov. 25—Federal mediators reveal that steel industry-union negotiations will be reopened shortly.

Military Policy

- Nov. 1—It is indicated in Washington that the Navy has asked for a 1961 budget appropriation of \$1.9 billion for its Polariss missile submarine program.

- Nov. 4—A one-ton capsule designed to carry a human passenger into space is successfully tested.
- Nov. 6—It is revealed in Washington that former Army Chief of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor has criticized the Administration's military policies in a book he will release January 5.
- Nov. 7—A Discoverer VII satellite is launched into polar orbit.
- Nov. 8—The Air Force reveals that the instrument capsule on the Discoverer VII has not been ejected as planned and cannot be recovered.
- Nov. 10—The atomic submarine Triton is commissioned at Groton, Connecticut.
- Nov. 16—President Eisenhower supports a defense budget for fiscal 1961 of some \$41 billion.
- Nov. 20—The Air Force reveals that Captain Joseph W. Kittinger has successfully completed the longest parachute jump in aerial history, parachuting more than 14 miles. Discoverer VIII is fired into orbit.

Politics

- Nov. 2—Massachusetts Senator John Kennedy supports continuing suspension of nuclear testing.
- Nov. 3—Democrat Bert T. Combs wins the Kentucky governorship with a record 165 thousand vote margin.
- Indiana's municipal elections favor the Democrats. The Democrats win control of every major city.
- Richardson Dilworth is re-elected as mayor of Philadelphia, defeating former Minnesota Governor Harold Stassen.
- A Republican wins the election for coroner and ranger in Holmes County, Mississippi.
- Nov. 7—Democratic National Chairman Paul M. Butler pledges the best housing and the best convention seats to state parties with the best financial records for party support.
- Nov. 14—A "Draft Stevenson" campaign formally opens in Wisconsin.
- Nov. 17—New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller sends "every good wish" to a New Hampshire "Rockefeller for President" rally.
- Nov. 18—Rockefeller suggests a Western hemisphere economic union.
- Nov. 19—Rockefeller lauds the American

Legion for "unremitting vigilance against atheistic communism."

- Nov. 23—Butler predicts that the next U.S. President will be elected on the fifth ballot of the Democratic National Convention.

Segregation

- Nov. 27—An Atlanta Federal District Court refuses to allow a delay in the presentation of a school desegregation plan for Atlanta.
- Nov. 28—A Circuit Court convicts a segregationist for bombing the Little Rock school board office.
- Nov. 30—The Atlanta school board suggests that 116,000 school children in Atlanta should attend school "without regard to race or color." A rigid pupil placement plan is presented; desegregation would occur for one grade a year starting with the twelfth grade.

Supreme Court

- Nov. 7—In an eight to one decision, the Court upholds the use of the Taft-Hartley injunction procedure as it has been applied to striking steelworkers. (For the text of this decision, see pages 51-52 of this issue.)
- Nov. 16—The Court rejects a petition of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters asking for a review of the Circuit Court of Appeals decision validating the United States District Court appointment of three monitors to check on the Teamsters Union.
- Nov. 23—The Court votes 7 to 2 that suspicion alone is not grounds for a police arrest; the conviction of John Patrick Henry for unlawful possession of stolen radios is set aside.

VATICAN, THE

- Nov. 16—It is reported that Pope John XXIII will appoint 8 new cardinals, enlarging the Sacred College to 79 cardinals.
- Nov. 28—Pope John in an encyclical tells Roman Catholic missions to intensify their activities.

YUGOSLAVIA

- Nov. 6—The biographer of Marshal Tito, Vladimir Dedijer, is given a passport to teach in England for one year. Dedijer has been in disfavor since 1954.

Marshal Tito sends a message to Premier Khrushchev on the eve of the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.

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Feb. 15—Boris Pasternak, author of *Dr. Zhivago*, discloses that he will seek readmission to the Soviet Writers' Union.

Feb. 16—The Soviet Union reiterates that it knows nothing of the 11 missing American airmen.

Feb. 18—The Soviet Union says it has evidence, i.e., "remnants of special technical apparatus," which proves that the missing plane of last September "could not lose its course."

Feb. 20—Reports from Communist sources in East Europe reveal that despite his retention of high posts, Chairman of the Presidium of the Soviet Union Marshal Kliment Y. Voroshilov was part of the June, 1957, "anti-party" movement defeated by Khrushchev.

Feb. 21—Soviet newspaper statements declare that the U.S.S.R. will not risk Arab hostility by permitting Jewish emigration to Israel.

Feb. 25—Swedish, Danish and Norwegian Ambassadors to Moscow invite Khrushchev to visit their countries.

March 1—The Soviet Union advises Pakistan against signing the projected military agreement with the U.S.

Elections are held in 9 republics for the Supreme Soviets of the republics and for the local soviets.

Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's strong foreign policy statement refusing to accept a foreign ministers' conference on Berlin during British Prime Minister Macmillan's visit is belittled by the Premier himself as "an electioneering speech."

March 2—The Soviet Union agrees to a foreign ministers' conference, although still preferring summit talks. The Kremlin asks for parity by including Poland and Czechoslovakia at the foreign ministers' meeting.

March 3—Ending unsuccessful talks in Moscow on the Berlin question, British Prime Minister Macmillan and Soviet Premier Khrushchev agree on a British-Soviet trade and cultural exchange. Both leaders support working out an arms agreement to reduce forces and a ban on nuclear weapons.

March 4—Khrushchev arrives in East Germany and promises that a peace treaty will be signed giving East Germany "full

sovereign status" (See also *International, Berlin Crisis*).

March 5—All candidates in the recent elections in 9 republics win.

Russia protests the detention of its fishing trawler by the U.S. The U.S. suspects that the trawler had ruptured a trans-Atlantic Cable.

March 9—Moscow authorizes the formation of voluntary police brigades for maintaining order and good conduct.

March 12—Khrushchev returns from East Germany.

March 15—Soviet organs report that the chief of the Communist party of the Uzbek Republic and his aide have been removed from their posts.

March 16—Khrushchev tells a visiting Iraqi delegation that U.A.R. President Nasser's anti-Communist policy will fail. It is reported that the Soviet Union gave \$150 million to assist Iraqi industry, agriculture and communications. The two nations sign an agreement for long-term economic and technical aid. (See also the *U.A.R.*)

March 17—Communist party changes in the Uzbek Republic extend to its government; the Chairman of the Republic's Council of Ministers is removed from this post.

March 18—Two West German leaders report that Khrushchev told them that "no one," including the Soviet Union, "wants Germany reunified."

March 20—*Tass*, the Soviet official press agency, announces the demotion of Iosif I. Kuzmin, as head of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) and as a deputy premier. Kuzmin, who drafted Khrushchev's seven year plan, is given the rank of minister and made head of the new coordinating body, the scientific economic council.

March 21—The U.S. State Department releases figures showing that during the last year the Communist bloc gave to 18 underdeveloped nations \$1 billion in aid.

March 23—The U.S. informs the Soviet Union that it has good reason to believe the Russian fishing trawler off Newfoundland badly damaged five trans-Atlantic cables and asks that the guilty parties be punished.

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
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
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